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During the last decade, most Andean countries implemented a set of fiscal reforms aimed at 
strengthening public finances, enhance resource allocation and contribute to macroeconomic 
stability. However, despite recent improvements in fiscal performance, public finances remain 
vulnerable, fiscal policies have often been pro-cyclical and debt sustainability continues to be a 
challenge in the region. Although considerable attention has been given to fiscal rules and 
institutional reform to address some these weaknesses, there is a growing effort to try understand 
the outcomes of fiscal policies from a political economy perspective.  
 
Understanding the budget process as the arena where decisions regarding the use of public funds 
take place and society faces constraints and trade-offs regarding the use of its resources is a key 
ingredient to provide useful recommendations for improving public expenditure management in 
Latin American, and ultimately increase the sustainability, efficiency, and representativeness of 
public expenditures.   
 
This study presents the case of Ecuador. The report describes the main actors (formal and informal) 
involved in the budget-making process, and  presents evidence regarding  the main political and 
economic determinants of fiscal performance. It also  discusses whether different political and 
institutional arrangements governing the budget process affect incentives for the composition of the 
budget. 
 
This study is part of  “The Political Economy of the Andean Countries” project financed by United 
Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and coordinated by Fidel Jaramillo, 
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Principal Economist of the Research Department (RES), and Carlos Scartascini, Senior Research 
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Processes, and Policy Outcomes” (PMP).  
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The budget process is the policy arena par excellence where distributional conflicts from society 
are channeled through formal institutions and rules in repeated and predictable political 
interactions.  This paper seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature by analyzing the formal 
rules, incentives, and coalition dynamics of the relevant budget players behind the process of 
design, approval, execution, and oversight of budgets. Earlier works have focused on quantifying 
the magnitude of the association between political institutions (elections, party systems) and 
different measures of fiscal performance (fiscal balance, debt to GDP ratio).  In turn, the current 
research agenda requires a systematic analysis of the different arenas and stages in which 
budgets are made.  The executive, local governments, and organized interest groups have 
significant agenda setting powers; the national legislature embodies the regional and ideological 
ambitions of diverse constituencies; and diverse bureaucratic agencies are empowered to execute 
and monitor budget allocations. These interactions are also guided by the fiscal and electoral 
calendars, thus providing predictable incentives for cooperation or defection.  The variable of 
interest is the quality of budget outcomes, a composite notion that seeks to evaluate four 
dimensions of budget performance: whether budgets allocations are representative of the 
interests of the majority, are sustainable over time, are efficiently allocated, and can be adaptable 
to changing economic circumstances. 
 
The paper tests the validity of the proposed analysis of budget dynamics in Ecuador, a country 
where major political and economic transformations of recent years, including the adoption of 
considerable constitutional reforms in 1998 and the move to dollarization in 2000 should have 
altered the representative, efficiency, flexibility, and sustainability of budget outcomes. 
 
The budget process in Ecuador takes place in a contentious policymaking environment 
characterized by high dependency on oil revenues, unstable budget institutions, and generally 
uncooperative political actors.  Oil revenues, when available, alleviated distributional conflicts 
among short-sighted rent seekers at the expense of fiscal discipline.  Political fragmentation was 
often an obstacle to the possibility of updating obsolete fiscal rules or providing adequate policy 
responses to unexpected external shocks.  Two recent events have further altered budget 
dynamics, including the time horizons, rent seeking incentives, and arenas of interaction of key 
budget players. At a first glance, the 1998 Constitution and adjacent political reforms reduced 
transaction costs around the budget process, by granting larger agenda setting powers to the 
president, and effectively marginalizing legislators from the process.  The move to dollarization 
in 2000, and the subsequent adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2002, further reduced 
the discount rate of political actors and formally imposed other restrictions that allowed to 
enforce fiscal discipline. 
 
Overall, empirical findings assessing the effect of these major policy changes on budget 
outcomes suggest that: 
 
1.  Budget outcomes in Ecuador are more sustainable (less vulnerable to shocks), by looking 
at public debt outstanding, if oil prices remain high. This feature is partly explained by 
formal and de facto incentives to fiscal discipline imposed by Constitutional reforms and  
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dollarization, but sustainable outcomes remain mostly sensitive to variations in oil 
revenues. 
2.  Budget outcomes are more efficient, measured by lower levels of budget reallocations 
during the process as well as more efficient education spending.  The shift is partly 
explained by the greater agenda setting power of the president to make budgetary 
allocations, and the limited ability of legislators to bargain budget allocations for their 
constituencies during the budget process. 
3.  Budget spending has become less representative, as measured by per capita spending by 
province. This outcome is observed despite the adoption of electoral and constitutional 
reforms designed to increase political representation. 
4.  Budget outcomes have become more rigid (less flexible) over time, as measured by the 
levels of earmarking of revenues and expenditures.  Some earmarked expenditures rose to 
constitutional level in 1998 (like 15% of the budget for local governments) and after 2000 
some taxes and oil revenues have been further earmarked. 
 
This paper explains that the net effect of both sets of reforms, the new constitution and 
dollarization, was to "squeeze out" of the budget process the incentives for political bargaining.  
Given the fact that presidents had greater powers to set agenda and legislators lost access to 
bargaining budget allocations for their constituencies, we argue that these key budget players lost 
incentives to form budget coalitions in the national arena.  Instead, this paper begins to document 
a significant "shift" of political dynamics to the sub national arena.  We argue that the municipal 
and provincial governments have become central characters in the political process and are 
effective in influencing budget allocations and shaping budget dynamics.  The empowerment of 
the executive helps the interpretation of more "efficient" budget outcomes; high oil prices and 
self-imposed constraints to the spending of oil revenues explain more "sustainable" budget 
outcomes; whereas the shift to the sub national arena helps explain an observed bias of budget 
spending towards certain provinces and a greater earmarking of resources which benefit -directly 
or indirectly- local governments. 
 
The paper argues that the budget process in its current form does not provide the basis for a 
stable equilibrium in the long run.  In the first place, politicians at the national and sub national 
arenas do not have incentives to form credible -and durable- budget coalitions around the 
bargaining of budget allocations for public interest. In the absence of such coalitions, constraints 
through formal rules that impose conditions of discipline and austerity have proven useful in 
maintaining discipline in the short run.  Not surprisingly, the congress and the president have 
recently voted to abolish key aspects of a Fiscal Responsibility Law to allow for greater spending 
during an electoral campaign year.  The other cause for instability in the long run is that rising oil 
prices have increased the rent seeking incentives of politicians, included the president.  As a 
result, oil stabilization funds originally created to benefit from oil revenues and sustain 
dollarization efforts, have been further earmarked with projects of short term interest. 
 
The paper structure is as follows.  The first part provides a brief characterization of the economic 
and political background of Ecuador in the last three decades.  The second part offers a 
theoretical overview of existing literature, the proposed dimensions of budget outcomes and the 
variables of interest.  The next section identifies two critical moments of change in the 
Ecuadorian budget process: the 1998 Constitutional reform and the 2000 move to dollarization.   
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Sections 4 and 5 describe the formal stages of the budget process in Ecuador and analyze the 
roles of the main budget players on the budget process. Section 6 empirically tests the impact of 
constitutional reforms and economic dollarization on the quality of budget outcomes.  Section 7 
summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
 
1 Background 
The policymaking process 
The Ecuadorian policymaking process is characterized by a permanent tension between a very 
strong agenda setting player (the president) and multiple veto players who are active in the 
national legislature, the sub national governments, organized interest groups and the streets. This 
perverse configuration of diverging interests and actors with few formal incentives to support 
government coalitions over the long run, has gained the country a reputation of being “a very 
difficult country to govern”. In the last decade alone, high levels of ethnic and regional conflict, 
military (in)action, economic decline and congressional deadlock played at different times a 
contributing role in the demise of three presidents before the end of their terms.
1 
 
Earlier research suggests that presidents have at least two alternative options when promoting 
policy change.   The first one is to submit legislation to a highly fragmented and contentious 
national legislature.  But evidence shows that presidents, despite having strong constitutional 
powers to legislate including the ability to decree legislature, have obtained poor success rates in 
a legislature where they have lacked –single party- congressional majorities in more than seven 
decades.  In average, only 30% of the presidents’ agenda gets approved by congress, one of the 
lowest in the region (Mejia Acosta 2006).  Policy deadlock or rigidity is due to several factors, 
including of course, political fragmentation, but also the lack of formal incentives to form and 
sustain coalitions. Political fragmentation results from a very permissive and badly apportioned 
electoral system which has allowed for the proliferation of multiple political parties. 
Additionally, the presence of local caudillos and charismatic party leaders has further polarized 
the political arena by appealing to existing ethnic and regional divisions.  Ecuadorian politicians 
have also lacked the formal incentives to sustain multiparty coalitions.  The existence of 
legislative term limits for the most part of the current democratic period, created rent seeking 
politicians who lacked long term ambitions.  In average, no more than 14% of legislators sought 
and obtained reelection in congress between 1979 and 1995 (Mejia Acosta 2006).  Term limits 
also eroded the value of coalition incentives.  Opposition parties perceived that participating in a 
government cabinet may become an electoral liability in the next round of elections if the 
government fails to pass reforms.  But the fear of failure became a self fulfilling prophecy as 
parties and legislators had greater incentives to disband or deny any government collaboration as 
new elections approached. Instead, governments and legislators preferred to assemble ad hoc 
ghost alliances by trading pork barrelling projects, distributing resources and patronage to 
constituents, making particularistic policy concessions, granting personal favors, etc, in exchange 
of legislative support (Mejia Acosta 2006).  The overall effect was a highly ineffective and costly 
bargaining process that produced very little policy change. 
 
                                                 
1 Not all factors contributed to political instability.  For example, economic recession was a key factor leading to 
Mahuad’s ousting, but not in the case of Gutierrez’, which occurred in a period of economic growth.    
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The second avenue for policy change has been to delegate and empower a decisive technocracy 
or bureaucracy to carry out reforms by marginalizing political parties in the legislature.  These 
executive-sponsored bodies such as the Monetary Board, the Central Bank, or the National 
Council for Modernization, enjoyed much discretionary power to produce policy change, and 
were often able to produce decisive policy changes.  The downside to this route is that such 
policy changes were directly linked to the interest groups participating of the decision making 
process and policies were undone or frequently revised every time a new government came into 
place or even within the same administration.  This pattern of policy volatility is best illustrated 
by the adoption of at least nine exchange rate regimes prior to the dollarization of the economy 
in 2000 (Mejia Acosta et. al. 2006).  Insulating the decision making process from a highly 
fragmented political environment was not a stable equilibrium either and directly or indirectly, 
legislators and shifting political alliances contributed to high turnover rates of key cabinet 
ministers and decision makers.  Evidence shows that the average mandate of a Finance minister 
was approximately 12 months (Mejia Acosta 2006).  
 
At both ends of this convoluted policymaking process, a set of formal and informal “last ditch 
veto players” played a dramatic role to oppose, stall, or revert policy decisions that were not 
found acceptable.  The formal players are often made of disgruntled party members who have for 
instance, appealed to a judicial review of the supreme courts, or the Constitutional Tribunal, to 
challenge and stall the implementation of a law that passed through a congressional coalition or a 
technocratic body.  Non conventional policy players included the indigenous, the military, 
popular groups who took to the streets to oppose adopted changes, and to challenge the 
legitimacy of the regime as a whole, as illustrated by the popular revolts that led to the ousting of 
presidents Bucaram, Mahuad and Gutierrez.  
 
The oil factor 
Oil is Ecuador’s main export and its primary source of fiscal revenues. Between 2000 and 2005, 
oil revenues were, on average, 26.4% of non-financial public sector revenues and 35.1% of 
central government revenues.  Given the high dependence of public revenues on oil exports, the 
Ecuadorian economy is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world price of oil 
(Fernandez and Lara, 1998) or other natural disasters that may affect the steady supply of oil 
(such as the 1987 earthquake that broke the oil pipeline). An interruption in oil revenues could 
rapidly trigger a fiscal crisis. This vulnerability explains in part the country’s poor or unstable 
economic performance during the last democratic period.  The underlying premise is that 
fluctuations in oil prices also affect the impact of institutional variables on the budget policy-
making process, as well as the incentives to fiscal discipline available to budget players. 
 
During the years 1998 to 2005, which are also the main focus of this document, three different 
periods can be identified in the trend of variation of Ecuadorian oil prices (see figure 1). The first 
period is between January 1998 and October 1999, when prices remained low, at an average of 
$12.6 per barrel. The second period occurs between November 1999 and April 2004, when 
prices increased to an average of $23 per barrel. Lastly, during the third period -between May 






Figure 1: Monthly oil prices and period averages 



















































































































The periods that characterize the evolution of oil prices are consistent with the general pattern of 
variation in fiscal outcomes. Table 1 illustrates that variation in oil prices can also be mapped 
unto three periods of fiscal performance between 1998 and 2005.  During the first two years 
(1998 and 1999 and largely to low oil prices), the budget has large deficits. Then, between 2000 
and 2004, the deficits are reduced and the net balance is actually positive, partly due to higher oil 
prices. During this short period -with oil prices remaining relatively stable (see figure 1)- the 
non-oil deficit also decreased from 7.7 to 4.4% of GDP, partly thanks to the constraints imposed 
by dollarization and later reinforced by the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL).  In other words, 
even when oil prices became stable, they still caused a positive impact on other budget factors 
that contributed to an overall improvement of fiscal outcomes. 
 
 
Table 1. Evolution of fiscal results 
(relative to the non-financial public sector and in percentage of GDP) 
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Budget  global  deficit  -5.2  -4.9  1.5 0.0 0.8 1.1 2.1 0.7 
Non-oil  deficit  -9.1 -11.2  -7.7 -6.3 -4.8 -4.7 -4.4 -5.4 
Total  revenues  17.3 21.1 25.9 23.3 25.6 24.1 24.8 25.2 
Oil  revenues  3.9 6.3 9.2 6.4 5.6 5.8 6.4 6.1 
Non-oil  revenues  13.4 14.8 16.7 17.0 20.0 18.3 18.4 19.1 
Expenditures  22.5 26.0 24.4 23.3 24.7 23.0 22.7 24.5 




In 2005, the net positive balance of fiscal accounts decreases in magnitude and the non-oil 
deficits experiences a rise. This is consistent with a reversion of the trend that had been observed 
in the earlier years and after dollarization. It is in this year where there is a shift in economic 
policy through a legal reform that de facto eliminated the limitations to the expansion of public 
expenditure that were determined by the FRL. This event occurs when oil prices reach their 
highest level (see figure 1). This legal reform is voted by the same political parties who, three 
years earlier, had approved the original draft of the FRL. This is suggestive evidence of changes 
in preferences and behaviors of the actors of the budget PMP that are closely related to 
movements in oil prices. 
 
Given the contentious nature of the policymaking process and the high dependency on oil 
revenues, Ecuador has not demonstrated a capacity to adapt to shocks (policy rigidity), nor has 
improved its ability to sustain agreements over time (policy volatility). Fiscal policy is set within 
a complex frame, where the budget plays an important role, not only because of the magnitude of 
the resources it allocates, but because of its rigid structure due to earmarking. A rigid budget 
imposes one additional constraint to the capacity of fiscal policy to adapt to external shocks.  
This constraint is enhanced with the adoption of dollarization which de facto limited the range of 
adjustment instruments available to the executive.  The windfall effect of rising oil revenues can 
temporarily alleviate the fiscal rigidity imposed by dollarization, but this factor does not replace 
the need for deeper structural reforms.  During the last thirty five years, the inability to make 
necessary fiscal reforms has been one of the elements hindering the success of adjustment 
programs (Hurtado, 2006). 
 
2 Theoretical  Framework 
 
This section outlines the main theoretical and empirical implications of studying budget 
outcomes, discusses four dimensions associated with this concept and their tradeoffs, and 
outlines existing explanations found in the specialized literature.  
 
2.1  The Dependent Variable: the quality of budget outcomes 
 
Following earlier work by Scartascini and Stein (2004), this section is interested in identifying a 
set of favorable or desirable characteristics of budget outcomes.  Ideally, budget outcomes 
should be sustainable over time, they should produce highest long-run returns, they should 
reflect the preferences of the majority and they should be able to adapt to positive and negative 




This feature seeks to find consistency between the costs of budget transactions with the inter-
temporal budget constraint. This notion is measured in two ways: 
a.  Whether there is systematic and consecutive growth of the budget deficit over 
time compared to the growth of GDP, and  
b.  Whether the budget is heavily dependent on oil revenues vs. non oil revenues, and 
how this ratio evolves over time.  
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The evolution of sustainability of budget outcomes during the period of study is illustrated with 
cross-country data for the Andean nations, highlighting trends and discontinuities that are 
specific to the Ecuadorian case. Secondly, the paper uses secondary sources to document what 




This dimension explores the magnitude and direction of reallocation of resources during the 
budget process. It is organized in two parts.  
a.  The first part quantifies the magnitude of spending reallocations across items at 
different stages of the budget process (Scartascini and Stein 2005) and it identifies 
whether significant changes in the magnitude of spending reallocation are at all 
related to the instances of political and economic reform studied in this paper. The 
underlying assumption is that budget processes characterized by large and 
constant spending reallocations are more likely to be inefficient in that they 
prevent medium-term expenditure planning and introduce uncertainty in the 
institutions whose operations rely on the budget. 
b.  The second part explores the evolution of the efficiency of public spending in 
basic education, as a case study. By focusing in one particular sector, it is possible 
to look at specific variables that are indicative of how efficient (in an economic 




This dimension measures whether expenditure allocation reflects preferences of population at 
large or benefits private interests. These changes are assessed in two ways: 
a.  By looking at changes in per capita provincial spending, controlling for disparities 
in poverty and population (poverty rates vs. number of poor),  
b.  These budget outcomes are related to critical changes in the electoral system that 
altered the fundamental of territorial representation (one person, one vote) during 
the period of study. 
 
4. Rigidity  vs.  flexibility 
 
This dimension explores the extent to which existing budget allocations reflect long term 
political agreements between different budget players (budget coalitions), or whether they result 
from short term and non-cooperative allocation of resources (“hardwiring”) that leave budget 
players with very little space to adjust to unexpected circumstances. In the Ecuadorian context, 
this is done by explaining the composition of budget rigidities (earmarks) on the revenue side as 
well as on the expenditure side.  A brief discussion follows on the role played by increasing oil 
revenues and its impact on the likelihood of obtaining long term cooperation. 
 
2.2  The Determinants of Budget Outcomes 
 
Budget outcomes are determined by factors such as the number of actors in the budget process, 
their level of influence, the rules of interaction between them, the number of instances of  
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interaction, the present value of the benefits from cooperation, and the enforcement mechanisms. 
While a particular change along one of these independent variables may improve certain 
characteristics of budget outcomes, they may have the opposite effect on others.  This section 
identifies three sets of variables affecting budget outcomes: changes in the incentives of budget 
actors, changes in the configuration of budget institutions, and external shocks. 
 
Changes in the incentives of political actors  
The existing literature broadly distinguishes a set of political institutions that would contribute to 
centralizing the budget process, thus contributing to more disciplined and sustainable budget 
outcomes (Alesina and Perotti 1999; Hallerberg and Marier 2004; Scartascini and Olivera 2003).  
Among these variables are: 
•  a stronger presidential mandate 
•  stronger presidential prerogatives to initiate budget 
•  higher reelection rates of legislators and/or longer time horizons of politicians 
•  lower number of parties overall or higher number of parties represented in the budget 
coalition 
•  lower levels of ideological polarization 
•  greater electoral proportionality, in territory and electoral formula 
•  limited decision making process in legislative committees 
•  the timing of the electoral cycle (proximity to next election) 
 
Changes in budgetary institutions  
Similarly, existing works have illustrated how specific budget rules that account for a more 
hierarchical budget process may contribute to greater fiscal discipline (Alesina et. al. 1999; 
Scartascini and Filc 2004, Samuels 2003).  These include: 
•  a greater level of centralization of the budget making process in the hands of the 
executive 
•  the presence of caps on expenditure or constraints to limit the congressional ability to 
generate new spending lines  
•  the elimination of off budgetary items 
•  a greater level of budget transparency 
 
Changes in economic conditions or exogenous shocks (that in theory would encourage 
more/less cooperative outcomes): 
Finally, there is a set of changes in economic conditions that may alter incentives for political 
cooperation or directly affect budget outcomes.  For the Ecuadorian case, relevant events in the 
period we will study are: 
•  Dollarization 









3  Critical Moments in the Ecuadorian Budget Process 
 
Over the past three decades, Ecuador has witnessed a wide array of endogenous and exogenous 
changes that theoretically and empirically have had a significant impact on the design, approval, 
execution, and control of the budget process. Constitutional changes approved in 1983, 1994-
1998, and 2000 affected the composition, time horizons and incentives to cooperation of political 
actors.  Others have directly affected the rules of the budget process itself, including the approval 
process, the allocation of expenditures, fiscal responsibility, oversight, and control mechanisms. 
Table 2 outlines which were the most relevant changes that constitutional reforms and 
dollarization imposed on political institutions and the rules of the budget process itself.  The next 
section explains how a reduction in the number of the relevant budget players, the changing 
ambitions of political actors, the expansion of time horizons, the lack of coalition currencies, the 
frequency of interactions and the existence of monitoring mechanisms altered the quality of 
budget outcomes in Ecuador.   
 
Table 2. Critical moments and hypothesized effects on cooperative budget outcomes in Ecuador 
 
  Constitution 1998  Dolarization 2000 (and LRF) 
Sustentability  [more]: longer political horizons  [more]: lack of monetary policy adds 
rigidity to fiscal policies 
LRF – greater incentives for fiscal 
discipline 
Efficiency  [more]: Executive has greater agenda 
setting power 
[more]: LRF introduces greater visibility/ 
accountability for budget execution  
Representativity  [more]: greater proportionality of 
political representation 
 
Adaptability  [less]: Constitution earmarks taxes end 
expenditures 
[more]: lack of monetary policy should 
induce some flexibilization of budget 
 
3.1  The 1988 Constitution 
The National Assembly that produced a new Constitution between 1997 and 1998 was inspired 
by the need to strengthen political institutions that promoted increased governability and 
improved political representation.  In practice, the approved reforms strengthened presidential 
powers over congress (governability), while at the same time aiming to strengthen the connection 
between citizens and politicians (representativity).  Together with other closely related reforms, 
these reforms introduced a mixed set of incentives for political cooperation.   
 
In the first place, reforms increased the level of influence of the president in the budget process, 
at the expense of legislators. Presidents were granted exclusive rights to initiate the process and 
their decree and veto powers were increased.  Congress was banned from increasing 
expenditures or creating new revenues, and legislators were no longer allowed to bargain 
provincial allocations or discretionary -off budget- funding for their districts, but rather approve 
budgets based on sectoral spending (partidas de gasto).
2  Secondly, reforms sought to reduce the 
number of actors participating in the budget process.  The number of legislators was reduced 
from 123 to 100.  After 1998, congress became more provincially oriented; as provincial 
legislators were elected through a personalized vote and the figure of national legislators (elected 
                                                 
2 This occurs after a 1995 plebiscite.  
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on a national slate) was abolished. Internally, the seven-member budget committee gained 
greater agenda setting power to revise the executive’s proposed budget, but the decision making 
power for budget approval was devolved to the entire congressional floor.  Lastly, reforms 
extended the temporal horizons of budget players.  Legislators were allowed to seek reelection 
since 1996 and their mandate was extended from two to four years (thus eliminating mid-term 
elections).  Legislative appointments and committee service was also extended from one to two 
years. In theory, this should have had contributed to expanding the legislators incentives for 
making inter temporal agreements, since legislators were appointed for longer periods in 
congress while they accumulated more experience over time. 
 
In practice, the 1998 Constitutional reforms produced a perverse combination.  On the one hand, 
the increased budget powers of the president made him less dependent on gathering legislative 
support for budget approval and it strengthened his ability to execute budget allocations. 
Legislators in turn, gained greater political representation vis-à-vis their constituents (they 
enjoyed longer terms in office with no term limits, and were elected by personalized voting), but 
had lost their ability to access to investment projects for the benefit of their constituencies. This 
combination severely hindered politicians’ prospects for developing an “electoral connection” 
with their voters.  Concurrently to the drying out of coalition incentives at the national level, a 
series of institutional reforms strengthened the abilities of local governments to become 
successful lobbyist in the budget process and develop a successful electoral connection with 
voters.  The trends and empirical evidence of this shift are properly discussed in section 5 and 6.  
Suffice here to say that traditional political parties who lost their influence on the national budget 
process, reappeared as crucial actors in a new policy arena: the sub national governments.
3   
 
3.2  The 2000 Dollarization 
The governments’ decision to dollarize the economy on January 2000 came as a drastic response 
to contain or at least mitigate the effects of a financial crisis that threatened with hyperinflation, a 
stagnating economy (with GDP going down by 6.4% on 1999), falling world oil prices, and a 
generalized disbelief in the governments’ ability to produce economic recovery.  A positive 
effect of dollarization is that it brought inflation down to levels that the country had not 
experienced in over two decades and provided economic agents with signals of stability that had 
been very much sought after. Dollarization formally reduced the possibility that the devaluation-
inflation cycle eroded the real value of budget allocations. By bringing economic stability 
dollarization decreased the discount rates of economic agents. 
 
By renouncing to monetary policy, the government gave a strong signal of its commitment to a 
structural reform in the hopes of stabilizing the economy and recuperating some credibility at 
home and abroad.  In terms of the budget process, the drastic change to dollarization eliminated 
one of the policy arenas where presidents did have some discretionary power to adopt and 
resoluteness to carry our policy decisions.
4  By renouncing to monetary policy, dollarization 
                                                 
3 A brief description of all the changes that have been made on the budget's legal framework can be found on Table 
3, at the end of the section 4. 
4 After the 1998 Constitution, the Central Bank had recently undergone a reform that increased its independence.  
The Central Bank had been under intense political pressure to rescue the private financial institutions that were at 
risk during the crisis. These institutions were - at large - from the Coastal region. It is not by chance that the 
economic sectors that proposed - and finally succeeded- the adoption of dollarization were also from the Coast (See 
Mejia Acosta et. al. 2006).  
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reduced the number of policy instruments available to the economic authorities, thus imposing an 
additional burden of responsibility over fiscal policy. 
 
In the aftermath of dollarization, and while the country was still paying the economic price of the 
financial crisis, many government policymakers as well as development banks favored the 
adoption of reforms that would secure responsible fiscal management. Policies like the adoption 
of a Fiscal Responsibility Law and the creation of an oil fund - that reveal a change in the inter-
temporal preferences of agents- took place in the years following dollarization and were 
consistent with a change in agents’ discount rates and with higher public-regardedness of the 
benefits of sound fiscal policy.   Additionally, the adoption of dollarization brought transparency 
to public accounts. In the past, public balance sheets had a line item called “exchange rate 
adjustment” under which –in theory- adjustments due to exchange rate fluctuations could be 
recorded. In practice, this account could mask small or not-so-small allocations that were 
accountable to no one.  De facto, dollarization eliminated this and other incentives for 
speculation with the exchange rate.  
 
4 The  Budget  Process 
 
This section briefly analyzes the formal budgetary process in Ecuador.  The end of the section 
outlines the most relevant reforms operated in the past decade, including a brief description of 
the budget process before and after the reform and its proposed outcomes.  The actual workings 
of such institutional changes are discussed in the next section. 
 
The fiscal year begins on January 1st and ends on December 31st of the same year. The 
Executive branch starts the budget cycle in May each year through the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (MEF) by sending the budgetary guidelines established by the MEF to the Executing 
Units (UE). The Executing Units can report back to the MEF their budget estimations until June 
30th each year. The president of the Republic sends the information gathered by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance to National congress until September 1
st. Congress evaluates and issues a 
report on the matter until November 30th each year (see Figure 1), with the exception of the 
years in which a new president takes office, when the budget is presented until January 31st and 
approved until February 28th. Meanwhile, the budget from the previous year is still in effect.
5 
 
All resources than have not been fully executed by the Executing Units during the fiscal year, are 









                                                 
5 Political Constitution, Art. 258. 
6 MEF website, SIGEF terminology. An Executing Unit will be understood as the administrative unit (organizations 
or groups) that executes an assigned budget.  
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Source: MEF, valid regulations. Authors’ elaboration 
 




4.1 Formulation  Stage
8 
The public sector’s budget is comprised of the Non Financial Public Sector budget, which 
includes the General Government Budget (GGB); the public enterprises, sectional governments, 
and special funds budgets; and the Financial Public Sector budget, as in Central Bank and other 
public financial institutions. The main participants in the stage of  budget design are: i) the 
president of the Republic; ii) the National Planning Office (SENPLADES); iii) the Executing 
Units; iv) the Ministry of Economy and Finance; and v) the  Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) (see 
Figure 2). 
 
The main actor in regulating the public sector’s budget formulation and the responsible of 
elaborating the GGB proposal is the Executive branch through the Ministry of Economy and 
                                                 
7 Public Sector Budget Law, 1992. 
8 The budget replicates the previous years’, adjusted by inflation, but it would be interesting to analyze cases in 
which economic growth is different from inflation. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the middle 
ranks of the bureaucracy have a significant decision-making power that has not been properly explored by literature. 
Some relevant questions at this stage are whether MEF officials in charge of the budget design are career 
bureaucrats or political appointees that change with every government, and whether the Central Bank plays any 
significant role in sharing technical expertise to compensate for the lack of planning capacity of the MEF. 
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Finance. The MEF begins the budgetary process with the presentation of the National 
Development Plan, which gathers the national guidelines and policies established for each fiscal 
year, and the macroeconomic indicators handed by the Central Bank of Ecuador.
9 Based on the 
information obtained from the SENPLADES and the BCE the MEF hands in the macroeconomic 
guidelines to the different Executing Units (UE) until April 30th of each year
10 for them to 
develop their budgets. In accordance with the fiscal responsibility principles,
11 the Law 
establishes that the MEF can not present a budget proposal with a Non-Financial Public Sector 
deficit higher than 2.5% of the Gross Domestic Product for that year. Outlays destined to cover 




The Executing Units elaborate their budget estimations based on the annual financial needs for 
plans and regional and institutional programs that entities and organizations of the public sector 
require.
13 The MEF, through the technical experts
14 in the Sub-secretary’s office of Government 
Accountability and the Sub-secretary’s office of Budgets respectively, centralizes the 
regulations, analyzes and consolidates the budgetary information sent by the UEs considering 
budgetary ceilings and restrictions related to regulations established by law. The fiscal budget is 
mainly made up of salary and wages, maintenance, and basic services expenditures, categories 
that are indexed to inflation and represent an inertial amount in the elaboration of the GGB.
15 
The UEs turn in their information through the SIGEF system until June 30
th each year. Any 
additional investment requirements have to be previously approved by the SENPLADES, and 
their financial viability has to be certified by the Sub-secretary’s office of Public Investment.
16 
The MEF analyzes the collected information and before consolidating it, verifies compliance 
with the macro-fiscal rules by the UEs. If the macro-fiscal rules have not been accomplished, the 
MEF can amend the information. 
 
Once the information is consolidated, the Executive has until September 1
st to send the budget 
proposal to congress for their analysis and approval. 
 
4.2 Approval  Stage 
 
The National congress has the prerogative to approve the General Government’s Budget, and 
ensure its proper execution.
17 The main participants in the budget approval stage are: i) the floor 
or Pleno of  National congress, ii) the specialized congressional committee, iii) the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, iv) the technical experts that represent the state’s recollection, execution 
and control units (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
9 Political Consitution, Art. 258. Interview #1, BCE technical experts (those who are career bureaucrats) work in 
coordination with the Sub-secretary’s office of Economic Policy of the MEF before handing in the macroeconomic 
indicators.  
10 Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency Law, Art. 33. 
11 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 4. 
12 Added through Art. 60 of the 2000-4 Law, O.R. 34-S, March 13, 2000. 
13 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 11. 
14 MEF, career bureaucrats with technical expertise. 
15 Almeida María Dolores, Gobernabilidad Fiscal en Ecuador, July 2005. 
16 MEF, Sub-secretary’s office of Public Investment, Methodology for Ranking Investment Projects. 
17 Political Constitution, Art. 130.  
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The president of congress receives the budget proposal from the Executive. According to the 
legal mandate, “the president of National congress will send to the correspondent Committee 
each project of law for its study and will later inform on it”.
18 Even though there is no explicit 
disposition that confirms it,
19 the committee in charge of the revision of the budget proposal is 
the Committee of Tributary, Fiscal and Banking Issues.
20 The Committee is in charge of 
delivering to the Pleno of congress a detailed report on the proposal sent by the Executive. 
 
Specialized permanent committees are made up of seven principal members and their deputies, 
who assume their functions for a two-year period and can be reelected.
21 No alternate 
congressman can be principal or deputy member of a committee. During the stage of budget 
proposal analysis, the specialized committee asks for information and opinions from the different 
governmental entities, either at the income level through the Internal Revenue Service (SRI) or at 
the expenditure level through the different Executing Units. The specialized committee writes up 
a report with observations and general guidelines about the budget proposal, which is turned in to 
the president of congress, who then puts it in the official agenda for its debate in plenary session. 
In Ecuador, there is no congressional Budget Office that can make its own estimates and 
forecasts of the fiscal situation.  
 
During the plenary session, the president of the specialized committee presents the report in the 
Pleno of National congress. Legislators can ask for specific changes to the proposal based on the 
general guidelines established in the report from the specialized committee. As one of the 
attributions exclusive of the Central Bank’s board of directors, it can inform congress of the 
existent limits on public indebtedness.
22 
 
Once the report is issued, congress has until November 30
th each year to approve or reform the 
proposal, which is discussed in only one debate, by income and expenditure sectors. If until such 
date the budget is not approved, the proposal, as elaborated by the Executive, becomes valid.
23 
 
4.3  Execution Stage  
 
The Political Constitution establishes the Executive branch, through the MEF, as the responsible 
of executing fiscal policies. The main players in the budgetary execution stage are: i) the Sub-
secretary’s office of Budgets, MEF, ii) the Nation’s Treasury, MEF, and, iii) Executing Units. 
                                                 
18 Ecuadorian National congress’ Law, Art. 39. 
19 1998’s Constituent Assembly eliminated from the constitutional text the list of specialized congressional 
Committees in which the Committee of Tributary, Fiscal, Banking and Budget Issues was in charge of studying and 
informing on the budget proposal. 
20 The Committee of Tributary, Fiscal and Banking Issues is responsible for the elaboration of reports on the projects 
of law related to taxes, fees and contributions; the private and public financial system; the customs system; public 
control entities such as the General Comptroller’s Office, Superintendences, and Central Bank. In practice, no other 
committee deals with fiscal issues. 
21 Ecuadorian National congress’ Law, Art. 31. Reform introduced by the 1997 Constituent Assembly. See Table 3. 
22 Idem. Art. 263. 
23 Political Constitution, Art. 258. This change is introduced in 1996, after a plebiscite in 1994 (the first plebiscite 
called by Durán-Ballén) took away from legislators the possibility of negotiating resources directly. The 
questions/answers in the plebiscite were: i) Question 3. Should legislators be able to manage fiscal budget funds? 
No.  ii) Question 4. Should legislators approve the State’s Budget by expenditure sectors or budgetary entries? 
Sectors.  See Table 3.  
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Once the GGB is approved by congress, the MEF ensures that it complies with the fiscal 
responsibility principles. The Sub-secretary’s office of Budgets and the Nation’s Treasury are in 
charge of transferring the approved resources to the UEs. 
 
The Executive branch, through the MEF, nonetheless, has the attribution to modify the approved 
GGB,
24 given that as is established by Law, the rules of transfers, increases or reductions and 
other budgetary modifications are established by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
25 The 
MEF receives and approves the requests for resource transfers from those responsible of cash 
programming in the UEs, which depend partially or totally from the GGB, based on the 
information of their inflows, payment of obligations and financing disbursements.
26 
 
The budgetary execution is marked by the budget’s financing, its source of origin and the 
frequency of cash entry. There is often a lack of coordination between revenues and expenditures 
due to the timing and volume of revenues from tax collections and their execution schedule 
because revenues from income taxes are higher in April while current expenditures in the GGB 
are constant.
27 This situation has established a priority order in the transfer of resources towards 
those UEs responsible of budgetary execution. Additionally, the MEF can adjust the 
correspondent cash programming based on the spending capability of the UEs.
28  
 
The priority order is directly related to the budget structure by expenditure accounts and is 
applied when the effective, current non-oil revenues in the GGB are less than what was budgeted 
for the quarter.
29 The Ministry of Economy and Finance can amend allocations in the 
expenditure budget, including to transfers and participations, in the same amount of those 
revenues that were not obtained. These amendments can not affect those allocations determined 
by the Constitution. In the event that amendments are made to investments, they have to be 
subject to prioritization according to the multi-annual plan of government and to the hierarchy of 
the projects that are being carried on by the Executive.
30 
 
4.4 Control  Stage 
 
The follow-up and control of the budgetary execution is responsibility of the General   
Comptroller’s Office (through the system of control, censuring and auditing of the State), and 
National congress.
31 The Ministry of Economy and Finance also plays a role in budgetary 
control. 
 
During the fiscal year, the MEF analyzes the budgetary execution of the UEs and, in the event of 
considering it necessary, can adjust the correspondent cash programming.
32 The system of 
                                                 
24 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 54. 
25 Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency Law, Art. 41.  
26 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 27. 
27 SRI, tax collection statistics 2000-2005. 
28 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 27. 
29 Interview #2.  
30 Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency Law, Art. 41. 
31 Political Constitution, Art. 258. 
32 Public Sector Budget Law, Art. 27.  
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control, censuring and auditing of the State
33 has two components: i) internal control, and ii) 
external control. The UEs have to ensure the creation and maintenance of their internal control 
system, through which public servants and functionaries report on and make themselves 
responsible for the execution of their attributions, the use of public resources and the results 
obtained.
34 The internal control exercise has to be applied before, during and after
35 through the 
specialized units in each of the UEs, which have to comply with the valid regulations established 
by Law. 
 
External control is exercised by the General Comptroller’s Office and National congress, being 
the active participant the General Comptroller’s Office. Even though there is a constitutional 
mandate for National congress to follow-up on the budgetary execution, in practice it has no 
technical capacity to do it.  The participation of the General Comptroller’s Office is ex-post the 
budgetary execution; therefore, timely alerts on the execution and quality of expenditure of the 
UEs have to come from the internal control. It is worth mentioning that the large number of UEs 
makes it impossible for the General Comptroller’s Office to exercise external control on all of 
them systematically.  
 
 
The following table sums up the main formal reforms to the budgetary process in the last decade: 
 
Table 3. Main institutional reforms to the budget process (1994-2002) 
 
Reform Legal  Body  Before  After  Effect 
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33 General Comptroller’s Office Law, Art. 6. 
34 General Comptroller’s Office Law, Art. 5. 
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Source: Valid regulations, CORDES. Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
It is worth noting that the sequence of fiscal reforms reflected many conventional beliefs about 
which institutions should strengthen the budget process, including for example, laws of fiscal 
responsibility, centralizing decision making authority through hierarchical budget institutions, 
and constraining the politicians’ ability to handle discretionary budget allocations.  As it will be 
illustrated in the next section however, such political discretionary power had been instrumental 
to forming policy coalitions in the fragmented Ecuadorian polity, thus the elimination of such 
incentives should have theoretically increased transaction costs.  
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5  The politics of the Ecuadorian Budget Process 
 
 
This section seeks to identify - at each stage of the budget process- the incentives that different 
budget players have to comply with, existing formal budget rules, and the extent to which actors 
produce alternative patterns of cooperation around most preferred policy outcomes.  The 
Ecuadorian budget process illustrates a case where the adoption of stricter budget rules to 
enforce greater fiscal discipline after the 1998 constitutional reforms and the dollarization 
process, did produce favorable budget outcomes but at the price of dissolving political incentives 
to sustain longer term coalitions.  
 
The general overview of the Ecuadorian policymaking process highlighted several institutional 
impediments to the formation of political coalitions, including the social and political 
fragmentation of actors, the existence of term limits and the eroding value of coalition incentives.  
For the most part, such factors have also remained present in the budget process even after the 
adoption of constitutional reforms that expanded the time horizons of policymakers. In general, 
reforms strengthened the agenda setting role of the president at the expense of marginalizing 
legislative actors from the budget process. In theory, it was expected that presidents could 
impose and apply fiscal goals without having to form costly legislative alliances. Furthermore, 
political incentives to assemble and sustain government coalitions were dismantled, as legislators 
were no longer able to bargain budget allocations for provincial interest or access discretionary 
funds.  In practice, some of the distributive conflicts over budget allocations were translated to 
the sub national arena, where provincial and municipal governments have gained greater access 
to earmarked resources (up to 15% of government spending) and have successfully lobbied for 
other sources of government spending.  
 
At the margins of the budget process, and consistent with the portrayed role of last ditch veto 
players, less powerful and organized political actors including labor and teaching unions, have 
taken to the streets to demand greater spending or effective execution of approved allocations. 
Figure 3 maps the influence of the main political actors and lobby groups. The colored diamonds 
indicate the formal and informal instances in which political actors may influence (or puncture) 
the budget process.  We identify three types of budget actors: 1) decisive players who have the 
formal or informal power to influence in policy formulation (i.e. the executive, business lobbies, 
local governments), 2) veto players whose cooperation is needed to adopt policy changes (i.e. the 
legislature, political parties), and 3) last ditch veto players who may exert effective pressures to 
demand budget execution or revert unwanted policy decisions (i.e. courts, unorganized groups).
36  






                                                 
36 These categories are not mutually exclusive and a budget player may have more than one role on the policy 
process, i.e. a city mayor may be a decisive player in budget formulation but can also mobilize constituents on the 
street and become a last ditch veto player to demand effective budget execution (see Mejia et. al. 2006).  
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Figure 3: Political timeline of the budget process 
 
 
   Source: MEF, interviews 1,2 y 3.  
 
 
5.1 Executive  initation 
 
The executive branch in Ecuador has exclusive powers to initiate the budget process and it 
maintains a significant influence throughout budget execution as well. As it will be illustrated in 
this section, the overall balance of reforms adopted with the 1998 Constitution and dollarization 
have tended to strengthen the executive’s agenda setting power over the budget process (both in 
the hands of the president and the Minister of Finance), while limiting or counteracting 
congressional influence.   
 
There are three visible players interacting at this stage: the president who is the main agenda 
setter, the Minister of Finance who is an agent of the president in charge of liaising public 
sector’s demands with technical criteria and constraints, and the Executing Units (Unidades 
Ejecutoras) that submit budget proposals to be considered in the General Budget.  A fourth set of 
political actors, the sub national governments, have recently become influential players in the 
budget process. 
5.1.1 The  president 
According to the Constitution, the executive is the sole responsible for initiating the budget 
process. presidents in Ecuador are elected by a run off system every four years and cannot seek 
immediate reelection.  Between 1979 and 1996, the electoral calendar tended to produce “fiscally 
conservative” presidents at the beginning of their terms, who gradually relaxed their austerity 
ambitions as new elections drew near and legislative partners became more costly or more 
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reticent to cooperate.  In an attempt to counteract the electoral cycle, legislation approved in 
1998 and 2002 introduced mechanisms for fiscal responsibility and long term planning. 
 
In theory, the executive should have limited space for maneuver since more than 90% of the 
budget is earmarked.  In practice, the president has used his agenda setting power and technical 
capacity –plus the fact that congress lacks a congressional Budget Office to verify or replicate 
fiscal forecasts- to underestimate revenues and overestimate spending when submitting a budget 
proposal.  An important source of negotiation has been the extensive use of discretionary 
spending (gastos reservados) available to the president before 1998.  presidents are believed to 
have used this item to mask political agreements without disclosing the nature and the magnitude 
of the transactions.  But executive discretionality also led to corruption scandals that involved 
senior government officials using gastos reservados to buy legislative loyalties in congress, and 
to invest in sectional governments and education during the Durán Ballén, Bucaram, and Alarcón 
administrations.  In 1997, a resolution of the General Comptroller imposed a ceiling on gastos 
reservados, which could only amount to 0.25% of the General Budget and limited its use to the 
Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs.
37  A year later, the 1998 Constitution completely 
eliminated discretionary spending from the Executive to increase fiscal transparency and 
accountability. 
 
5.1.2  The Ministry of Finance 
 
During the formulation phase of the process, the Minister of Finance elaborates and sends the 
technical guidelines for budget formulation to the UE. He also aggregates and consolidates the 
proposed allocations into the General Budget for submission to congress. In consolidating the 
budget, the Ministry of Finance faces two types of requests: increases in recurrent spending and 
increases in capital spending. Pressures in favor of the former usually happen before the 
consolidation of budget information done by the Ministry of Finance and they usually come from 
groups such as teacher or doctor unions, pensioners, the military and the police, who request 
salary or pension increases.
38 Requests for increases in capital spending come, independently, 
from different sub national governments and begin in April
39. Here it is both municipalities as 
well as provincial governments (or Consejos Provinciales) who lobby the Ministry of Finance. 
The actors with the strongest political presence and negotiation power are those from the largest 
provinces (Pichincha, Guayas, Azuay, and Manabí) and the largest cities (Quito, Guayaquil, and 
Cuenca) in population terms. These are also the actors who are most likely to succeed in their 
requests for increases in capital spending. The most influential representatives from sub national 
governments bring their requests directly to the president (see below), who ultimately delivers 
these messages to the Ministry of Finance. The demands from sub national governments and 
                                                 
37 “Límites a los Gastos”. Diario Hoy, Quito. May 16, 1997. www.explored.com . The exact amount in 1997 was 50 
thousand millon sucres.  
38 Interview #2 
39 Interview # 4.  Local governments tend to increase their lobbying efforts towards April, which is the time of the 
year in which income tax revenues flow into government coffers.  
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their negotiation are more likely to succeed when their requests are included in the budget 
proposal before it sent to congress for approval.
40  
 
In practice, the Minister of Finance enjoys great discretionality during the formulation stage.  
Traditionally, between 1979 and 1996, the responsibility over fiscal policy was directly or 
indirectly shared between MEF, the Monetary Board, and the Central Bank.  With the 
elimination of the former, the strengthening of the technical cadres of the bureaucracy at MEF, 
and the nominal independence of the latter after the 1998 constitutional reforms, more power and 
centralized decision making authority landed in the hands of MEF.  This formal change of rules 
empowered MEF’s role in the budget process, but in the eyes of the opposition, the Finance 
minister became a vulnerable political figure.   Traditionally, MEF has been the most policy 
influential but also the least partisan and most volatile ministry in the government.  Between 
1979 and 1998, nearly 80% of all Finance Ministries did not have an explicit partisan affiliation.  
The Finance Ministry seemed to have been trapped in a cycle of instability. On the one hand, the 
government did not want to delegate technical economic policy making authority to party 
interests outside his own realm of control; but on the other hand, political parties had very few 
incentives to formally be part of a government coalition and wanted to avoid the policy and 
electoral liabilities of being called “gobiernistas” by other parties.  Thus, parties had electoral 
incentives to publicly attack the workings of the Finance Minister, even if they benefited from 
government budget reallocations. 
 
Like in a parliamentary system, MEF became a political fuse that was blown when a new 
executive-legislative alliance replaced an obsolete one, and a new minister –most likely another 
independent- was appointed in place. Between 1979 and 1998, the average tenure of Finance 
Ministers was 11.5 months in office (346 days) (Mejía Acosta et. al. 2004).  The 1998 
Constitution passed reforms shielding ministers from the danger of legislative impeachment and 
censorship, but reforms produced the opposite effect: the average tenure of the Finance Minister 
was reduced to 7.3 months (220 days) in the post-1998 period.
41  Ironically, the strengthening of 
the Finance Ministry after 1998 concurred with a greater volatility of ministers, as no Minister 
stayed long enough to formulate and execute the same budget
42.  Interestingly, most of the 
Ministers were ousted through their own resignation, not by congressional impeachment as it is 
commonly assumed.
43   
 
 
                                                 
40  Interview #2.  Even though Art.135 of the Constitution impedes legislators to negotiate, mediate or obtain 
allocations from the PGE, there are nevertheless prevailing lobbying mechanisms that seek to increase capital 
spending in the proposed budget.  
41 Calculated until December 30, 2005. 
42 More research needs to be done to properly model the interaction between the president and the Minister.  In 
principle, a Finance Minister is a powerful and stable player provided that he is a perfect delegate of the presidents’ 
authority.  But what happens when the MEF diverges from the presidents’ ideal position or most preferred interest? 
Ministerial instability could perhaps be better understood as an internal conflict of interests between the president 
and his own Finance Ministers. 
43 Between 1979 and 1998, only 3 out of 20 Finance Ministers were effectively impeached and censored by 
congress.  
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5.1.3 Executing  Units 
 
There are nearly 2.500 executing units
44, 80% of which belong to health and education sectors. 
In education, some units consist of: i) public schools (1.435); ii) rural school networks (196); iii) 
education units (61); iv) universities (27); v) cultural units CCE (22), among others. In the health 
sector: i) hospitals (43), ii) health centres by area (165), iii) provincial directorates (22), among 
others. Each unit submits its net budget proposal to MEF
45. Given the large amount of 
submissions, MEF analysts cannot properly examine the content and validity of each proposed 
sectoral spending plan. 
5.1.4  Sub national governments 
 
Since the mid nineties, sub national governments have become one of the most influential 
players in the formulation process.  Sub national governments comprise elected local authorities 
(or the regimen seccional autonomo) and president-appointed provincial governors.  Elected 
officials include provincial prefects who preside over the provincial legislature made of 
provincial counselors.  The 326 mayors preside over the municipal councils and, since 2000, 
local authorities are elected in off-years and they don’t have term limits.
46  
 
The strengthening of local governments in Ecuador is due to the gradual transfer of greater 
resources, better technical planning, and increased legal responsibilities and prerogatives. The 
Association of Ecuadorian Municipalities (AME), a lobby group of mayors, received and 
channeled international assistance to strengthen the capacity and technical planning of local 
governments as part of the National Program for Municipal Development (PDM).
47  The AME 
also lobbied the government for greater resource allocation to intermediate and small local 
governments who had less bargaining power than mayors in Quito or Guayaquil.   
 
Additionally, the adoption of a special Law for distributing (earmarking) 15% of the Central 
Government Budget for sectional governments in 1997 has strengthened their capacity to do 
public works in their districts.  Together with other transfers, it is estimated that sectional 
governments benefit from at least 20% of the General Budget and that they retain around 50% of 
the public sectors’ investment capacity
48 .  Increased municipal resources have contributed to 
improving basic coverage of municipal services such as water, electricity, sewerage, but perhaps 
most importantly, they shielded municipal governments from the 1999 crisis.
49   
 
A third factor of chance is the reform of the legal framework to grant mayors more prerogatives 
and responsibilities over resource allocation in their districts.  Some decentralization has already 
taken place with the adoption of a Ley Orgánica de Régimen Municipal and a Ley Especial de 
                                                 
44 MEF, Subsecretaría de presupuestos, SIGEF, Catálogo institucional, ejercicio fiscal 2006. 
45 María Dolores Almeida, Gobernabilidad Fiscal en Ecuador, July 2005 
46 Before 1998, the chief of the municipal government was the presidente municipal and only a handful of mayors 
from the larger Ecuadorian cities were elected.  After 1998, these politicians were elected as mayors for four year 
terms.  We claim that this is not merely a name change, but rather -as outlined in this section- there were significant 
changes in power, resources and prerogatives available to the new elected officials. 
47 The AME has been formally constituted since 1942. 
48 MEF and Santiago Ortiz, FLACSO, personal communication with the authors. 
49 Santiago Ortiz, FLACSO, personal communication with the authors.  
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Descentralización y Participación Social (approved in 1997), although in practice much of the 
formal policymaking prerogatives remain centralized.  The 2004 reform to the Ley Orgánica de 
Régimen Municipal intends to fill in this gap by strengthening municipal autonomy, but this 
reform is not likely to bring greater fiscal transparency since from a political perspective, mayors 
would have more incentives to prefer an increase on spending privileges rather than taxing 
abilities. 
 
The increased role of local governments as stronger budget players is reflected by a radical but 
consistent shift of political dynamics, from the national legislature to the sub national arena after 
1998.  As it will be illustrated in the next section, legislators and political parties have gradually 
lost their ability to bargain for provincial and discretionary allocations (1995), and the exchange 
of political favors with the government has been penalized with expulsion from the legislature 
(Ethics Code, 1998).  Thus, legislators and their parties have moved from a resource-dry and 
highly conflictive congressional arena to the sub-national arena, where they have been more 
successful in protecting their budgetary allocations, and where they enjoy more financial 
resources to maintain their hegemony, perform constituency services and maintain a healthy 
electoral connection.
50  During the 2000 mayoral elections, several party leaders abandoned their 
legislative seats to run for local governments, most prominently, this is the case of current 
mayors of Quito and Guayaquil, Paco Moncayo (ID) and Jaime Nebot (PSC) respectively.   
Politically, this seems to be a good strategy.  Some city mayors have enough leverage to bargain 
allocations directly with the office of the president, to run some public services of their own, 
such as the civil registry, and to influence important aspects of national policy making.   
Arguably, it is also perceived by mayors and the public opinion that democracy and 
governability was upheld in their cities at times of national political and constitutional crises. 
 
More empirical research is needed to understand the workings of a sub national budget making 
process.  Table 4 illustrates a dramatic increase in the number of mayors elected in Ecuador after 
the 1998 constitutional reforms.  The table shows a clear move of the most influential 
Ecuadorian parties to capture local government posts.  After 1998, nearly two thirds of the total 
number of mayoral posts available (in the 2000 and 2004 elections) was captured by the four 
largest parties (75% if we also count Pachakutik).  Furthermore, this partisan occupation of the 
sub national arena is consistent with regional trends of party competition.  On average, 52% of 
the mayors coming from “coastal” parties, PRE and PSC, won elections in “coastal” districts 
(while 31% and 16% won in the Highlands and the Amazon and Galapagos respectively).
51  By 
the same token, on average 52% of the mayors coming from “sierra” parties, the ID, DP and 







                                                 
50 Interview # 3.  
51 Coastal provinces are Esmeraldas, Manabi, Los Rios, Guayas and El Oro.  Highland districts are Carchi, 
Imbabura, Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Chimborazo, Bolivar, Cañar, Azuay and Loja. Amazon provinces are 
Napo, sucumbios, Orellana, Pastaza, Zamora Chichipe and Morona Santiago.  
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Table 4. Number of Mayors elected by political party, before and after 1998 
 
Party  Total Mayors  Before 1998  After 1998 
PSC  131  5 (12.5%)  126 (28.9%) 
PRE  74  9 (22.5%)  65 (14.9%) 
DP  55  5 (12.5%)  50 (11.5%) 
ID  53  3 (7.5%)  50 (11.5%) 
PCK  42  1 (2.5%)  41 (9.4%) 
PSP  21  0 (0%)  21 (4.8%) 
PRIAN  20  0 (0%)  20 (4.6%) 
CFP  19  2 (5%)  17 (3.9%) 
MPD  15  1 (2.5%)  14 (3.2%) 
Others*  46  14 (35%)  32 (7.2%) 
Grand Total**  476  40 (100%)  436 (100%) 
 
* Other parties before 1998 include: APRE, PCD, PD, PNR, PSE, PCE, PLRE, and FRA. After 1998, Other parties 
include PSE, PCE, PLRE, FRA as well as regional and provincial movements like: MFIMA, MFIP, MIAJ, MICLD, 
MICMS, MIJ, MIL, MIPB, MPTSF, MUPI. 
Source: Tribunal Supremo Electoral. 
** Before 1998, only 40 city mayors were elected in Ecuador, while a presidente municipal was the elected official 
for smaller cities. After 1998, these politicians were elected as mayors for four year terms.  As argued in this section, 
this was not a simple name change, but there were rather significant changes in power, resources and prerogatives 
available to these officials. 
 
This section suggested that the increased participation of local governments, especially after the 
1998 constitutional reforms, has contributed to the politicization of the budget process at the sub 
national level. The following section lends further evidence that political parties divided along 
regional lines, have moved away from the legislative arena thus contributing to the politicization 
of sub national governments and leaving a representation vacuum at the national level. 
 
5.2 Legislative  Approval   
 
Legislative approval is the stage where congress could have the most significant impact on the 
budget process, given its limited ability or capacity to influence the design and execution stages -
usually in the hands of the Finance Minister-, or perform budget monitoring -usually carried out 
by the General Comptroller.  At this stage, congress receives the budget proposal from the 
executive on September 1. and has three months (until November 30) to discuss the appropriate 
revisions in the Budget committee and approve the budget in plenary session.  Failure to consider 
the executive’s budget will result in the automatic approval of the president’s proposal.  In 
practice, the legislative ability to make a significant impact on budget contents and reallocations 
has diminished over time.  For example, congress can make amendments to the executive’s 




Consistent with the role congress has played in the broader policymaking process, it has been 
also perceived by the government and the public that the legislature significantly increases the 
transaction costs of budget approval.  Among other things, this is due to the highly fragmented 
                                                 
52 Political Constitution, Art. 258.  
 25
and regionalized nature of political parties in the unicameral congress.  Congress is composed of 
100 provincial legislators from 22 provinces who are elected by a formula that allows voters to 
express personal preferences for candidates but allocates seats using proportional 
representation.
53 Legislators are elected for a four year term with no term limits.
54  Additionally, 
the Ecuadorian congress is known for having one of the most regionalized party systems (Jones 
and Mainwaring 2003), and one of the worst malapportioned lower chambers in the region 
(Snyder and Samuels 2001).
55  The latter means that provinces with smaller populations are 
heavily over represented in detriment of the larger ones.  In 2002 for instance, a legislator from 
the province of Guayas represented approximately 22 times as many voters as those represented 
by a legislator from Galapagos.
56   
 
The combined effect of post 1998 reforms should have, in theory, increased the legislators’ 
incentives to cultivate an “electoral connection” with their constituents and therefore demand 
larger government spending for their provinces to advance their own political careers, without 
assuming the costs of fiscal discipline at the national level.
57  In practice, the legislators’ 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote in their provinces were offset by an increase of the 
executive’s agenda setting power in budgetary affairs and a decrease of the budget available to 
the executive for bargaining political support.  The following section discusses the impact of 
1998 constitutional reforms along three areas of the budget approval stage: the budget 
committee, the available currencies for political bargaining and the time horizons of legislators.   
 
5.2.1  Changes in the agenda setting power of the Budget committee 
 
The legislative committee in charge of revising the executive’s budget proposal is the Comisión 
de lo Tributario, Fiscal y Bancario (CTFB or Budget committee hereafter).  The 7-member 
budget committee has the prerogative to revise the president’s proposed budget and to suggest 
amendments –which include regional, sectorial and partisan demands- for their vote on the floor 
or Pleno.
58  The congress does not have the power to create additional spending lines.  Before the 
1998 constitutional reforms, the amended budget was voted by simple majority in the Plenario 
                                                 
53 The electoral formula to allocate votes into seats in Ecuador has varied greatly over time.  Between 1979 and 1996 
it featured a closed list system that gave party leaders strong prerogatives over candidate nomination and selection.  
A personalized form of voting was adopted in 1997, by which voters could elect as many representatives as seats 
were available in the district, regardless of party lists or party affiliation.  Some reforms have been introduced in 
2000 and 2001 to gradually return to a party list system. 
54 Before 1996 legislators could not be immediately reelected, and before 1998 provincial legislators were elected 
for a two year period only. 
55 In a comparison of 76 countries, Snyder and Samuels (2001) find that Ecuador has the second highest 
malapportionment in lower chambers after Tanzania (24% and 27% respectively), and the highest in the Latin 
American region, followed by Bolivia (17%). 
56  The problem of malapportionment was more severe before the 1998 Constitutional reforms, as the number of 
legislators changed from 82 in 1996, to 123 in 1998, and back to 100 in 2002.  The reduction in malapportionment is 
effective even after National legislators –who have an equalizing effect of territorial disparities- were abolished in 
1998. The reduction in malapportionment is effective even after National legislators –who have an equalizing effect 
of territorial disparities- were abolished in 1998. 
57 According to a elite survey, over 60% of Ecuadorian legislators considered in 1998 that bringing resources to their 
provinces was very important (Mateos and Alcantara 1998). 
58 The Budget committee was made of 5 members and their alternates between 1979 and 1983.   
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de las Comisiones Legislativas, a sub chamber or council composed of all legislators who were 
members of the five Permanent Committees.
59  This system, valid between 1979 and 1998, 
nominally gave budget committee members the prerogative to revise the presidents’ proposed 
budget, but retained real decision making power on the final amendments within the 35 member 
Plenario.   
 
The adoption of a different committee system after 1998 increased the agenda setting power of 
the budget committee while it disseminated decision making capability to the entire 
congressional floor (Pleno).  In the old system, party leaders bargained minimal winning budget 
coalitions outside the budget committee, directly negotiating the direction and the amount of 
budget allocations (partidas de gasto) between the executive and the Plenario.  Though budget 
bargaining was not cheap, coalitions were cemented with some degree of political credibility: 
budget allocations were granted to legislators’ constituencies and budgets were approved with a 
simple majority of partisan and independent Plenario members.  These allocations, though 
conventionally associated with the distribution of pork (or “troncha”) to clientelistic interest 
groups, they also contained investment projects that benefited provincial governments.  Thus, the 
allocation of resources to partisan strongholds could have helped cement sustainable coalitions 
around budget allocations.  
 
The practice of approving budgets in the Plenario generally benefited parties with larger 
contingents in congress.  The approval of the 1997 budget challenged this system, as president 
Bucaram bypassed traditional parties and approved his own budget agenda with the support of 6 
out of 7 CTFB members and 18 members of the Plenario (PRE and independent legislators).
60 
The excluded parties, PSC, ID, DP, MPD, and Pachakutik opposed the presidents’ maneuvering 
but failed to bring the budget debate to the entire congressional floor, where the opposition had a 
majority of seats.
61  The following year, these party leaders introduced the reforms which 
centralized agenda setting in the budget committee but opened the budget approval to the entire 
floor, under the discourse of increasing accountability in the legislative process.  In practice, 
party leaders sought to strengthen the parties’ control of the committee system as an insurance 
mechanism against the presidents’ ability to form cheaper and quicker budget majorities with 
individual legislators.  In following years, these parties also gained greater control of the budget 
committee.  A closer look at the partisan and regional composition of the 137 members 
appointed to the budget committee between 1979 and 2003, shows that parties and legislators 
gained greater control of the budget approval process in congress. The data suggests that parties 
and their leaders invested more resources in the strengthening of the committee system after 
1998.  Between 1979 and 1996, partisan affiliation to the CTFB was evenly distributed across 
political parties, with ID having 17% of all budget committee members during this period, and 
DP, PSC, PRE, CFP and PCE having had between 10% and 12% of the total number of 
                                                 
59 In addition to CTFB, the other four Permanent Committees were: Comisión de Mesa, de lo Civil y Penal, de lo 
Laboral y Social, y de lo Economico, Agrario, Industrial y Comercial. 
60 Diario Hoy, Quito, December 11, 1996.  www.explored.com.ec   
61 Incidentally, this is the same coalition of parties that two months later contributed to the congressional destitution 
of president Bucaram, in February 1997.  
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committee assignments each.
62  After 1998, 93% of the total number of committee assignments 
was nearly monopolized by four political parties: DP, PRE, PSC and ID in that order.
63  
 
This takeover of CTFB assignments also reproduced the regional party competition (PRE against 
PSC in the coast, DP against ID in the highlands) that has developed in congress over the last 
decade.  The territorial composition of the budget committee suggests that the 1998 reforms –
which also eliminated National legislators-, introduced a heavier representation bias in favor of 
larger provinces.  Before 1998, roughly 31% of CTFB members came from the three largest 
provinces, Pichincha, Guayas and Manabí, and another 12.3% came from the National district.  
After 1998, the percentage of CTFB members coming from the three largest provinces nearly 
doubled that of the previous period (57%).  One province alone (Pichincha), where the country’s 
capital is located, contributed with 42% of all members.   
 
5.2.2  Changes in politicians’ time horizons 
 
A second set of changes that significantly affected the budget approval process was the 
expansion of legislative time horizons. Longer time horizons should in theory provide incentives 
to develop political careers and sustain long-term agreements.  Legislative appointments 
(including the presidency of congress and legislative committees) were extended from one to two 
years, thus reinforcing existing incentives to expand legislators’ horizons given by the 
elimination of term limits (1995) and mid term elections (1998). Before the approval of these 
reforms, there is no compelling evidence showing that individual legislators pursued political 
careers or sought to accumulate legislative expertise (Mejia Acosta 2003).
64  In the entire 1979-
2003 period, only two legislators served in the CTFB more than five times, and three more 
served four times.  In only two cases, Simon Bustamante (PSC) and Wilfrido Lucero (DP-ID), 
legislators also presided over the budget committee –Bustamante-, or served as president of 
congress –Lucero-.  In the post-1998 era, five out of seven legislators appointed to the CTFB in 
1998, served in the committee for another two years. Although this is little data to generalize, 
legislators indicate a preference for accumulating seniority and budget expertise in the post-1998 
period. 
 
5.2.3  Changes in coalition currencies 
 
A third institutional change that affected the costs of budget approval was the requirement that 
legislators approve the budget by sectorial spending rather than by budgetary allocations, and the 
removal of legislators’ ability to execute budget funds for their provinces.
65  The proposed 
                                                 
62 The pattern is consistent with low levels of political expertise in committees during this period (Mejia Acosta 
2003). 
63 The total number of members is 14, 7 elected for a two year period in 1998 and 2000. 
64 Even for national legislators who were elected for a four year period, it was more interesting and politically savvy 
to “hop” to more visible committees such as Political Oversight (Fiscalización), rather than going to technical or 
policy committees. 
65 The Consulta Popular was held on August 28, 1994, and its exact questions were: ¿Deberían los Legisladores 
manejar Fondos del Presupuesto del Estado?, and ¿Deberían los Legisladores aprobar el Presupuesto del Estado 
por Sectores de Gasto, o por Partidas Presupuestarias?
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reforms were submitted by president Durán Ballén and approved by popular referenda (consulta 
popular) in 1994, as an attempt to reduce and eliminate legislators’ rent seeking incentives 
during the process of budget approval.  Before the reforms, legislators had access to provincial 
funds that were equally distributed from the budget.
66   
 
Why would the executive voluntarily abdicate its ability and discretion to distribute funds and 
bargain budget coalitions with legislators?  It was perceived within the Durán Ballén 
administration that budget approval and other political bargains were becoming too expensive to 
sustain, especially with certain political parties.  In a telephone interview, former Vice-president 
Dahik recognized that: 
 
“(a group of PSC legislators) would ask for provincial funds in return for supporting some of our laws (…) 
And their family members would be the contractors.  It was an absurd situation because their leaders were in 
opposition, but meanwhile some of the deputies were constantly sitting down with us, demanding money.  It 
was collective bargaining, and the whole process was very expensive” (Landau 2001: 47).
67  
 
By limiting the ability of the congress to reallocate provincial funds, the government had hoped 
to decrease the particularistic demands for government spending, and allow for a smoother, more 
technical process of budget approval.  The strategy to dry the available resources to “grease” 
political coalitions backfired, as party leaders refused to approve the proposed budget by 
sectorial spending and, according to the media, such parties insisted on obtaining budgetary 
allocations for their provinces and local governments.
68  One year later, frustrated party leaders –
who had earlier benefited from discretionary payments from the government themselves- 
accused Vice president Dahik of vote buying and mismanagement of discretionary funds (gastos 
reservados).  The corruption scandal drove Vice president Dahik out of office in 1995, but the 
congressional hearing during the impeachment trial revealed a complex network of legal and 
illegal transactions that were commonly used by the government to buy legislative support from 
political parties (Mejía Acosta 2006). 
 
In the aftermath of the Dahik scandal, and other corruption incidents during the Bucaram and 
Alarcon administrations, the newly elected 1998 congress sponsored and approved an Ethics 
Code, which further restricted legislators’ ability to negotiate material and political resources for 
their districts or themselves.  Although in theory the Code threatened defecting legislators with 
expulsion, it has not been applied to date, nor has it altered the incidence of party switching for 
political gain.  The effects of the eradication of coalition incentives on the budget approval 
process are best summarized by a congressional party leader:
69  
 
“In the past, corruption was very functional for governance. The Presidency, the administration’s Secretary 
General, the Minster of Defense and the Minister of the Interior all had discretionary expenditures. Even if 
many don’t like to accept it, these served in the past to buy legislators, to buy loyalties in detriment of (the 
                                                 
66 According to Landau, in 1993 legislators were entitled to an equal share of $500 million sucres from partidas 
presupuestarias, but in practice some legislators obtained the lions’ share of budget allocations while many others 
did not (See Landau 2001: 44). 
67 Alberto Dahik, Telephone interview by David Landau on Jan 30, 2001.  
68 According to Diario Hoy, PRE and PSC would have only approved the proposed budget if the government 
granted them 600 thousand millon sucres for their provinces.  Diario Hoy, Quito, December 30, 1994.  
www.explored.com  
69 Interview # 6. July 22, 1999.  
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discipline of) the political parties. A Budget Committee existed where, if conflicts arose, they were taken to 
the Plenary. It was a functional system: 18 years of democracy and there were no problems associated with 
the approval of the fiscal budget. The amount of the budget was negotiated by sectors, and legislators 
negotiated the amounts by entries, by allocations. It was an open secret. Legislators in the Budget Committee 
(…) negotiated giant allocations for themselves: they (arbitrarily) selected contractors, and it did not 
encounter problems with the Comptroller’s Office because they (political parties) controlled the provincial 
comptrollers, the judicial branch, etc. These mechanisms no longer exist.  While there is more transparency 
(in the budget process), sectors feel powerless to obtain gains and vent their frustration by radically opposing 
government initiatives”.   
 
The attempt to create a smoother and more transparent budget process at the approval stage by 
eradicating existing material incentives for coalition formation produced the opposite effect.  The 
lack of available and legal currencies dramatically increased the executive’s costs of approving 
budgets in congress and made coalition formation a more unstable and unreliable process.   
Assessing the changing costs of making budget coalitions remains an empirical question which 
can not be properly tested in the Ecuadorian context, given that there is no roll call voting data 
available, nor there is government expenditure data disaggregated by province.   
 
An evaluation of the overall impact of political reforms on budget approval poses interesting 
questions that deserve further research and empirical testing.  On the one hand, the strengthening 
of the budget committee and its increased control by parties and legislators after the 1998 
reforms is a paradoxical finding in the broader context where the Executive retains significant 
budget powers especially during formulation and execution.  Furthermore, these parties and 
legislators seem to be interested in seeking continued presence and gain expertise in the Budget 
Committee. On the other hand, legislators in the post 1998 period have lost access to key 
budgetary resources or formal currencies that would have encouraged and cemented more 
durable agreements around budget outcomes.  In short, a pending question is: Why would 
legislators have incentives to pursue continued political membership in a committee that has 
diminishing access to effective resource allocation?   
 
One hypothesis is that parties and legislators in the national congress have become imperfect 
agents of provincial representation, indirectly or marginally negotiating investment projects for 
the interest of their provincial constituencies, which are later executed by regional, provincial or 
municipal governments.  The case of Simon Bustamante, a PSC legislator from the province of 
Manabi is a good example to illustrate this possible link.  Bustamante has presided over the 
CTFB in three of the four times in which he has been a member, and it is believed that he has 
played a critical role in helping channel budget allocations and regional development programs 
to his native province.  Furthermore, his political party has gained an important presence in the 
provincial and municipal government over the last years.   
 
The other hypothesis, as already suggested in the earlier discussion of sub national governments 
(5.1.4) is that parties and legislators moved from the resource-dry legislative arena to the 
resource-abundant sub national arena, where they have more prerogatives to bargain for 
budgetary allocations.  Additionally, the possibility of reelection means that politicians have 
clearer opportunities to develop long term relations of accountability with their constituents.  
This could be the case of some legislators and influential leaders of their congressional parties 
who in 2000 abandoned the national arena to run successfully for local office: Paco Moncayo  
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(ID) who became mayor of Quito –twice-, Jaime Nebot (PSC) who became mayor of Guayaquil 
–twice-, and Jorge Marun (PRE) who became Prefect of the Los Rios Province.  
 
In any case, the two hypotheses suggest a significant shift of budget dynamics after 1998, from 
the national to the sub national arena. Further exploring these hypotheses would contribute to a 
better understanding of the political linkages between national and sub national governments in 
the budget process. 
 
5.3  Budgetary Execution  
 
Formally speaking, the UEs’ are primarily responsible for budgetary execution.  In practice, the 
Sub-secretary’s office of Budgets and the Treasury establish allocation priorities to avoid 
coordination problems in the allocation of the cash flow. According to the Law, the elaboration 
and execution of fiscal policies is the Executive’s responsibility, therefore the MEF, in 
accordance with the requirements and taking into account the budget’s lack of flexibility, 
establishes a priority order to assign resources according to its governance needs.
70 At the 
moment, the priority order is as follows: i) debt interest payments, ii) wages, iii) transfers
71 and 
iv) capital expenditure. Furthermore, the MEF can reassign and adjust the approved budget 
through modifications during the fiscal year without congress having to approve each 
modification.
72 For example, the MEF can cut up to a 5% in government expenditures once the 
final budget is approved. Additionally, the Minister has discretional powers to reallocate funds 
within the approved budget through the interpretation of budgetary classifiers, although this is 
not officially established. 
 
Table 5 describes the actual allocation of resources across spending items at each stage of the 
budget process. About half of the spending in the budget proposal presented by the Executive is 
absorbed by four sectors –some of them with the largest role of civil servants: Education, 
Defense, Health, and Social Welfare and Labor. In relative terms, allocation across sectors 
remains relatively stable during the process, with some clear outliers. Notwithstanding, there are 
differences on the relative ability of the different sectors to “protect” their share of total spending 
through the process, which will be explored in more detail later. The sector with the most 
dramatic decrease in its share on total spending through the budget process is Social Welfare and 
Labor, which at the proposal stage receives 6.7% of total spending, but at execution stage, 
represents only 3% of total spending.  
 
On the other extreme, (and consistent with the large degree of discretion of the Ministry of 
Economics throughout the budget process), the sector with the most dramatic increase in its 
share on total spending throughout the process is Finance, with only 2% of spending at proposal 
stage and 6% of total spending at execution. Note that there are also differences in the level of 
publicity across sectors: while transfers to sectors such as Social Welfare and Labor can be more 
advertised and controversial, nobody monitors or keeps track of the amount resources that go to 
Finance 
                                                 
70 Political Constitution, Art. 260. MEF, according to estimates, approximately 85% of the budget is assigned to 
current expenditures and debt payments. 
71 Includes transfers to sectional governments and compensations such as the Human Development Bond. 
72 Budget Law, Art. 54. According to estimates, approximately 2000 modifications were made to the GGB.  
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Table 5. Percentage composition of spending at different stages of the budget process 
 
   B  L  R  D     B  L  R  D 
1.6  1.4 1.4 2.8  2.0 2.5  2.6  6.0 
Administration 
1.0  0.7 0.8 2.1 
Finance 
1.4  1.8 1.6 6.0 
6.7  6.7 6.8 5.7  0.4 0.4  0.4  1.1  Agriculture 
2.9  2.9 2.8 2.6 
Industries and 
Trade  0.3  0.3 0.3 1.8 
7.9  8.4 7.9 8.9  1.7 1.9  1.8  1.9  Internal affairs 
2.3  2.1 1.5 1.9 
Judiciary 
0.9  0.8 0.6 0.6 
2.0  1.9 1.8 1.7  0.7 0.9  0.8  0.8  External affairs 
0.7  0.5 0.5 0.5 
Legislative 
0.3  0.4 0.3 0.2 
6.7  6.4 6.1 3.1  0.6 0.4  0.4  0.3  Social welfare and 
labor  3.3  3.0 3.0 1.1 
Environment 
0.4  0.1 0.1 0.2 
10.6  9.4 9.4 7.5  0.8 0.5  0.9  0.8  Public works 
6.4  3.2 3.0 1.8 
Other agencies 
1.2  0.3 1.3 0.3 
14.8  15.0 14.7 16.4  0.8  0.6  0.6  1.2  Defense 
3.2  1.6 1.7 1.8 
Natural 
resources  0.7  0.4 0.4 1.6 
2.7  2.5 2.5 2.2  8.6 8.2  7.9  7.4  Urban development 
and housing  1.6  1.1 1.2 1.6 
Health 
2.5  1.9 1.9 1.5 
21.1  21.9 21.6 21.5  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  Education 
5.7  4.2 4.3 4.0 
Tourism 
0.2  0.1 0.1 0.1 
12.6  13.1 13.3 12.3         Sub national 
governments  6.7  6.2 5.9 8.0        
 
Note: B=composition of spending in Executive budget proposal, L=composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, R=real 
composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, D=composition of spending in the total executed expenditure. Within each item, 
n=17 for column B (1990-2006), n=16 for column L (1990-2005), and n=15 for columns R and D (1990-2004). For comparability, debt payments 
have been excluded from the budget. 
Source: Data collected by the authors for this paper from congress and the Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 summarize the direction of reallocations during the budget process across 
sectors. Table 6 presents the sign (positive or negative) of the mean change in reallocation over 
the period of study measured as: share of item i at stage Y - share of item i at stage X, where 
stage Y is always subsequent (in chronological terms) to X. This means that a positive sign can be 
interpreted as a reallocation that increased resources (in relative terms) for any given item, while 
a negative sign is a decrease in the share spending that goes to that item. Table 6 summarizes the 
signs for all four pairs of stages in the budget process that are being examined (two related to 










Table 6. Direction of the changes in the composition of expenditure at different stages of the process 
 
  L-B R-B D-R D-B 
Administration -  -  +  + 
Agriculture -  -  -  - 
Internal affairs  +  +  +  + 
External affairs  -  -  -  - 
Social welfare and Labor  -  -  -  - 
Public works  +  +  -  - 
Defense -  -  +  + 
Urban development and housing  +  +  -  - 
Education +  -  -  - 
Finance +  +  +  + 
Sub national governments  +  +  -  + 
Industries and Trade  -  -  +  + 
Judiciary +  +  +  + 
Legislative +  +  -  + 
Environment +  -  -  - 
Other agencies  -  -  -  - 
Natural resources  +  +  +  + 
Health -  -  -  - 
Tourism +  +  -  - 
 
Note: B=composition of spending in Executive budget proposal, L=composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, R=real 
composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, D=composition of spending in the total executed expenditure. Within each item, 
n=17 for column B (1990-2006), n=16 for column L (1990-2005), and n=15 for columns R and D (1990-2004). For comparability, debt payments 
have been excluded from the budget. 
Source: Data collected by the authors for this paper from congress and the Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
 
The purpose of Table 7 is to construct an item typology. It is based on columns 2 and 3 from 
Table 6 – or the comparison of the budget presented to congress to the budget that was really 
approved and the comparison of the latter to what was finally executed. Sectors with very small 
participations in spending (less than 1.5% of total) are in italics. The table proposes four types of 
spending items: 
-  Successful lobbyists and over spenders: These are the items that succeed at attracting a 
larger share of spending both at approval and at execution stage. The items that fall under 
this category are strong –from a technical or a political standpoint- in the government: 
Internal Affairs, the Judiciary, and the Ministry of Finance. Interestingly, Finance appears 
to be more condescending with regards to its own spending than it is to others’ at 
execution stage.  
-  Successful lobbyists and under-executers: These are items that –at approval stage- receive 
a larger share of budget resources but that –later, during execution- end up spending less 
than their allocated share. It is likely that Public Works and Housing are sectors where 
expenses could be over-budgeted because the Executive knows it is relatively easy to 
make any adjustments out of capital investments at execution stage. The presence of Sub  
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-  National Governments in this category reinforces the notion that these actors can have 
different ways to influence budget dynamics and outcomes at approval and execution 
stages. A particular case is that of provincial strikes, often sponsored by the provincial 
authority, that get resolved when the central government commits to finance some local 
public investment. Frequently these resources are reallocated and accounted from the 
budget of the Ministry of Public Works, but transferred directly to the provincial 
government that executes the construction. These reallocations often occur under tight 
time pressure and therefore were never planned in the approved budget. They ultimately 
translate themselves into reallocations (within and across sectoral items) at execution 
stage. It is likely that they imply important tradeoffs in terms of other projects and 
priorities. 
-  Unsuccessful lobbyists and over spenders: These are items that receive negative net 
reallocations at approval stage but ultimately end up spending a larger share of the budget 
that the one which was initially assigned to them. The Administration and Defense fall 
under this category. These sectors seem to reserve their political capital to increase their 
share in the budget during execution, while keeping a low profile at approval stage.  
-  Unsuccessful lobbyists and under spenders: The spending in these items is negatively 
affected at both approval and execution stages. These are items with disorganized, 
disperse, or effectively weak political constituencies (External affairs, Social Welfare and 
Labor, Agriculture, Education, and Health). It is not surprising that they are the net losers 
in relative terms at both stages. All of the social spending is clustered in this cell. Despite 
the fact that two sectors in this cell absorb a large share of the salary spending (teachers 
and doctors), and although these are powerful and organized groups, the “constituencies” 
that they represent do not succeed at approval stage or even execution stages. At the same 
time – and given the large relative importance of Education and Health over total 
spending- they are also candidates to experience relative cuts at execution. Moreover, it is 
likely that due to the large bureaucratic structures under these sectors, they are relatively 
less flexible to adjust their budgets at execution stage, even when adjustments would 
mean increasing their relative share on total spending. 
 
Table 7. Types of budget lobbyists and executers (summary of table 9) 
Approval  
(Really approved – Presented)   
+ - 
+










Industries and trade 
Execution  
(Executed – Really approved) 
- 
Successful lobbyists but 
Under-executers  
Public works 
Urban development & housing 













Note: The sectors whose share in spending was less than 1.5% of total are in italics.   
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It is worth noting that the typology is of purely descriptive nature and says little as to the causes 
of different outcomes. Specially the issue of over and under spending could be related to multiple 
causes ranging from the limited technical capacity of the agency in charge of operationalizing 
that item of spending to the discretion of the Ministry of Finance at execution stage. An example 
of the former is the case of some programs with very small technical and operational capacity 
inside the Ministries of Social Welfare and Labor where the agency does not manage to use their 
resources during the fiscal year (which have been identified in the World Bank - Inter American 
Development Bank Public Expenditure Review). An example of the latter is the case of Public 
Works, which is usually an item that faces cuts and adjustments during execution since it has a 






73 establishes the actors related to this stage: i) Executing Units, ii) 
General Comptroller’s Office and iii) National congress. The system of control, censuring and 
auditing of the State
74 has two components: i) internal control and ii) external control. The UEs 
have to ensure the creation and maintenance of their internal control system, through which 
public servants and functionaries report on and make themselves responsible for the execution of 
their attributions, the use of public resources and the results obtained.
75 The internal control 
exercise has to be applied before, during and after through the specialized units in each of the 
UEs, which have to comply with the regulations in force established by Law.
 76 External control 
is exercised by the General Comptroller’s Office, which is an independent institution, and 
National congress, being the active participant the General Comptroller’s Office. Even though 
there is a constitutional mandate for National congress to follow-up on the budgetary execution, 
in practice it has no technical capacity to do it. The participation of the General Comptroller’s 
Office is ex-post the budgetary execution; therefore, timely alerts on the execution quality of 
expenditure of the UEs have to come from the internal control. It is worth mentioning that the 
large number of UEs makes it impossible for the General Comptroller’s Office to exercise 
external control on all of them systematically.
77  
 
The approval of the Access to Public Information and Transparency Law (LOTAIP) in 2004 
established a legal framework to facilitate the participation of citizens in the supervision of 
governmental actions and decision-making.
78The LOTAIP mandates that government entities 
publish at least the following information: i) legal base and organizational structure, 
ii)institution’s board, iii) wages; budgetary information; travel allowances; collective 
agreements; iv) auditing results and information on pre-contractual processes; v) list of people 
and businesses that have failed to fulfill contracts with the institution; vi) plans and programs 
that are being executed by the institution, vii) detailed information on domestic or foreign credit 
                                                 
73 Political Constitution, Art. 211. 
74 General Comptroller’s Office Law, Art. 6. 
75 General Comptroller’s Office Law, Art. 5. 
76 General Comptroller’s Office Law, Art. 12. 
77 According to estimates, 80% of the GGB is distributed in 100 institutions, with the General Comptroller’s Office 
contributing with 1,700 employees. 
78 LOTAIP, May 2004, Art. 4 and 8.  
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contracts; viii) forms of accountability to citizens; among others. Furthermore, the Law also 
establishes specific sanctions to illegitimate acts of omission or denial of access to public 
information by state functionaries. 
79 Even though the reform is recent, a number of citizen 
observatories have been organized to supervise the allocation and execution of fiscal 
expenditures. Some of the most relevant organizations that have an influence on the fiscal 
exercise are the Observatory of Fiscal Policy, the Observatory of Human Resources of the Health 
Sector, the Social Contract for Education, the Observatory of Children and Youth, the 
Observatory of Public Services, and the Observatory of Public Policies in the South, among 
others. In the long run, these watchdogs can play a complementary role to that of the 
governmental institutions to improve the quality of budgetary execution and distribution. 
 
6  The political determinants of Budget Outcomes 
 
This section presents empirical evidence to assess the impact of institutional reforms on the 
sustainability, representativity, efficiency, and flexibility of budget outcomes.  The level of detail 
and the type of analysis chosen for each of the budget outcomes were contingent on the 
availability of disaggregated data (regional or by budget item) for periods before and after the 
institutional changes. 
 
The first part of this section presents a brief discussion of the sustainability of budget outcomes 
that illustrates how the Ecuadorian trends in revenues and spending compare of those of other 
Andean countries. Based on a review of secondary sources, this section documents that 
dollarization had a positive effect in improving the sustainability of budget outcomes.  Secondly, 
the section offers a detailed analysis of the representativeness of budget outcomes. The effect of 
the 1998 Constitution is assessed by comparing the evolution of provincial budget allocations 
and a series of political variables reflective of the rules that were modified with this reform. The 
role of the Fiscal Responsibility Law is discussed through qualitative evidence that documents 
how incentives and timing affected the types of tradeoffs that congress was willing to make at 
budget approval.  The next subsection explores the efficiency of budget outcomes by combining 
two types of data: first, it analyzes the magnitude of reallocations across budget items throughout 
the different stages of the budget process, and secondly it looks in detail into a case study in the 
education sector. The final subsection analyses the adaptability and rigidity of the budget and 
concludes that it the rigidity has grown in the last years. 
 
6.1  Sustainability of budget outcomes 
 
This section discusses whether the trends in fiscal results that have characterized the period of 
study can be sustained over time. This question is particularly important given that Ecuador -
whose budget relies heavily on oil revenues- has experienced a period of stability (2002-2003) 
followed by a dramatic increase in the international price of oil (2003 onwards). While it is no 
possible to disentangle the direct and indirect effects of the1998 Constitution, the dollarization of 
the economy, and the rise in oil prices on fiscal sustainability, we argue that the Ecuadorian 
                                                 
79 LOTAIP, May 2004, Art. 4 and 8.  
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economy remains vulnerable to external shocks in oil prices and that this constitutes the Achilles 
tendon of the sustainability of budget outcomes.  
The material is organized in two parts. We begin with an overview of the recent evolution of 
Ecuador’s main fiscal variables in relationship to those of the other Andean countries to 
document some of the trends in fiscal sustainability during the period of study. The second part 
provides an assessment of the sustainability of recent budget outcomes by reviewing some recent 
empirical studies on the Ecuadorian economy. 
 
The evolution of three key fiscal variables -revenues, debt, and wages- in recent years is 
discussed first. On the revenues side, Figure 45 and Figure 56 depict the evolution of tax 
revenues and debt in the five Andean nations. Together with Venezuela, another economy 
heavily dependent on oil, Figure 4 illustrates that Ecuador has the lowest tax revenues as a share 
of total current revenues. The magnitude of the differences across countries is large: while tax 
revenues represented around 40% of current revenues in Ecuador and Venezuela in 2004, they 
were at least twice as large in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Consequently, tax revenues are 
substantially less erratic for the countries that are not heavily dependent on oil than they are for 
Ecuador and Venezuela, reflecting their vulnerability to changes in the international prices of oil.  
 

















                Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the debt of the central government as a share of GDP. The trend 
of this variable in Ecuador differs substantially to that of its neighbors and is clearly related to 
the causes of the 1999 financial crisis and the subsequent recovery of the economy. The share of 
central government debt over GDP decreases substantially after 1999 and Ecuador remains at 
levels close to those of Colombia and Peru.  The growth of GDP is a contributing factor to this 






















        Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
 
On the expenditures side, Figure 6 describes the evolution of public wages as a share of total 
primary spending between 1992 and 2004. The relative importance of wages on spending is 
substantially larger in Ecuador than it is in all other Andean nations except Bolivia. This factor 
was raised as a concern by the 2004 World Bank-Inter-American Development Bank Public 
Expenditure Review and explains part of the rigidity of Ecuador’s public spending that will be 
analyzed in a later section. The figure also illustrates a sharp drop in this item during the years of 
the financial crisis, followed by a clear recovery to levels even above the ones pre-crisis. 
 





















                 Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
  
 38
Table 8 presents Ecuador’s indicators from Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 as well as their 
averages during the pre and post dollarization and constitutional reform periods. The table shows 
that tax revenues have been systematically higher since the late 90s. This is related to important 
reforms in the internal revenue service. The table also illustrates that after 2000, there was a 
reduction in the share of central government debt on GDP and an increase in the share of wages 
on primary expenditure. These two patterns coincide with a period of stable and increasing 
international oil prices.  
 
 
Table 7. Indicators of fiscal sustainability 
 
   Tax revenues on 
current revenues 
Central government 
debt on GDP 
Wages on primary 
expenditure 
1992 33%  89%  37% 
1993 35%  73%  40% 
1994 38%  63%  43% 
1995 38%  67%  39% 
1996 36%  66%  39% 
1997 47%  58%  39% 
1998 57%  67%  42% 
1999 46%  98%  31% 
2000 45%  87%  25% 
2001 52%  67%  38% 
2002 48%  58%  44% 
2003 46%  53%  45% 
2004 43%  48%  44% 
Pre-post Constitution 
1992-1998 average  41%  69%  40% 
1999-2004 average  47%  69%  38% 
Pre-post dollarization 
1992-2000 average  42%  74%  37% 
2001-2004 average  47%  57%  43% 
 
Recent empirical studies of the fiscal sustainability of the Ecuadorian economy confirm that oil 
plays an important role in explaining recent trends. Díaz Alvarado, Izquierdo and Panizza (2004) 
found that although Ecuador’s fiscal indicators have experienced an improvement in recent 
years, there are elements that could trigger a fiscal crisis, such as the large volatility of revenues. 
Specifically, they document that the country is vulnerable to external shocks to its current 
account such as a change in oil prices. They also point at the rigidity of government spending as 
a second factor that could generate a fiscal crisis. This is of particular concern since under a 
dollarized regime (where fiscal policy is the only instrument to shield against shocks), it would 
be even more desirable to have flexibility in this tool.  
 
Another study on fiscal vulnerability in Ecuador (Barnhill and Kopits, 2003) assesses public debt 
outstanding and quantifies the effect of dollarization on fiscal sustainability.  These authors 
present simulations of the distribution of the Ecuadorian government portfolio to determine the 
value at risk at given confidence intervals. The method they propose defines the value at risk as  
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“the worst possible loss over a targeted horizon with a given level of confidence”.  The 
underlying assumption is that government adheres to all of the legal earmarking of its budget 
which –as has been documented here - is not always the case. Notwithstanding, their main 
finding is that dollarization substantially reduced fiscal vulnerability (the order of magnitude is 
between 14-16% of the net worth of Ecuador’s public sector). They identify that the components 
of the government’s balance sheet whose volatility has the largest contributions to fiscal 
vulnerability are: oil income, profits from state-owned enterprises, outstanding external 
liabilities, and liabilities of the pensions system. 
 
In summary, while the evidence does suggest that budget outcomes show signs of more 
sustainability in recent years, it strongly points to the role that high and stable oil prices have 
played and continue to play on these outcomes. It is unclear and unlikely that budget outcomes 
could be sustained under different conditions in the international oil market. Moreover, and as 
will be analyzed in more detail in the section on rigidity of budget outcomes, high oil prices can 
have direct effects not only on budget outcomes but they can also affect budget outcomes 
indirectly, through the behaviors and preferences of the actors of the budget process. 
Specifically, if a period of prosperity translates into permanent earmarking and rigidity of 
resources, this could augment the negative effect of a fall in oil prices on the sustainability of 
budget outcomes. 
 
6.2  Efficiency of Budget Outcomes 
 
The role of institutional changes on efficiency of budget outcomes is explored through two 
alternative paths. The first part of this section explores the evolution of budget reallocations 
throughout the different stages of the budget process. The second part of this section looks at a 
very concrete case study -spending in primary schooling- to assess the efficiency tradeoffs and 
overall expenditure patterns observed throughout the period of study.  
 
1.3.1. Efficiency in reallocations 
 
In this section, we assess the 1990-2006 trends in the magnitude and direction of budget 
reallocations at different stages of the budget process. The focus is on changes in the magnitude 
of budget reallocations that emerged before and after two institutional changes: the 1998 
Constitutional reform and dollarization. The role of the Fiscal Responsibility Law is also 
analyzed.  Following Scartascini and Stein (see Annex 1), we compute a measure of the total 
change in the composition of spending for each pair of stages in the budget process.  
 
This analysis focuses on a subset of the “XY intervals” in the budget process. Specifically, we 
compute the total changes in the composition of spending for the following intervals: 
CBL= Total change in the composition of spending between the Executive’s proposal and 
the budget law approved by congress. 
CBR = Total change in the composition of spending between the Executive’s proposal 
and the budget law really approved by congress. 
CRD = Total change in the composition of spending between the budget law really 
approved by congress and execution.  
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CBD = Total change in the composition of spending between the Executive’s proposal 
and execution. 
 
Both  CBL and CBR are approval intervals where the main actor responsible for budget 
reallocations is the congress in both the Budget Committee and the plenary. The congress 
decides on these reallocations based on the rules established in the laws (and the “acceptable” 
loopholes around them). Political pressure for reallocations - through different interest groups 
such as teacher unions or the sub national governments- can and does affect congress’s behavior. 
On the other hand, CRD and CBD are execution intervals, where it is the Executive that has the 
largest discretion. At these stages, organized groups –and especially those with capacity to 
mobilize and/or paralyze the country- are the most likely to succeed in obtaining budget 
reallocations in their favor.  The data allow us to compute CXYit for years t=1990 … 2005 (and 
thus the addition of time subscripts) across 19 budget items
80. 2005 data were only available for 
stages L and B. 
 
Table 8, Table 9 and Figure 7 present some summary statistics on spending reallocations, using 
the formulas described before. Table 9 and Figure 7 depict the magnitude of the total spending 
reallocations at each stage and for each year, while Table 10 presents summary statistics of the 
item-level means. While the overall trends are consistent (one is just a weighted sum of the 
other), Table 8 allows to explore the dispersion of the item-level changes and to test whether 
there are any systematic differences over time. 
 
Table 8. Total budget reallocations at different stages of the process 
 
Year CBL C BR C RD C BD 
1990 .0358  -  .0917  .0839 
1991 .0446  -  .0780  .1020 
1992 .0566  -  .1098  .1059 
1993 .0396  -  .1051  .0905 
1994 .0287  -  .1279  .1258 
1995 .0558  -  .1573  .1362 
1996 .0209  -  .1146  .1305 
1997 .0363  -  .1309  .1511 
1998 .0306  -  .1538  .1748 
1999  .0000 .0000 .1532 .1532 
2000  .0140 .0161 .2565 .2490 
2001  .1712 .0775 .1709 .2209 
2002  .0209 .0212 .1250 .1077 
                                                 
80 Legislative, Judiciary, Administrative, Environment, Domestic Affaires, Defense, External Affairs, Finance, 
Education, Social Welfare and Labor, Health, Agriculture, Natural Resources, Industries and Commerce, Tourism, 
Public Works, Urban Development and Housing, Sub National Governments, and Other State Agencies. For 
comparability, Debt Payments were excluded from the budget.   
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2003  .0164 .0420 .0981 .0838 
2004  .0002 .0000 .1023 .1023 
2005  .0078   -  -   -  
Average 1990-1998  0.039    0.119  0.122 
Average  1999-2005  0.033 0.026 0.151 0.153 
Average 1990-2000  0.033    0.134  0.137 
Average  2001-2005  0.043 0.035 0.124 0.129 
 
Note: B=composition of spending in Executive budget proposal, L=composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, 
R=real composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, D=composition of spending in the total executed expenditure. 
Within each year, n=19 expenditure items. For comparability, debt payments have been excluded from the budget. 




































Note: B=composition of spending in Executive budget proposal, L=composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, R=real 
composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, D=composition of spending in the total executed expenditure. Within each year, 
n=19 expenditure items. For comparability, debt payments have been excluded from the budget. 
Source: Data collected by the authors for this paper from congress and the Ministry of Economics  
and Finance. 
 
Two features are salient from Table 8 and Figure 7. First, they illustrate that for every year, the 









during approval. In other words, the Executive plays a more important role than congress on 
budget outcomes. Second, it is clear that after the 1998 Constitutional reform, the real 
reallocations in the budget approved by congress are smaller than the ones that appear masked in 
the budget law. Although with the new Constitution, the average size of real reallocations at 
approval stage is smaller than before the Constitution, the difference is tiny. Second, the shape of 
the lines reveals that the overall magnitude of the reallocations in spending at all stages of the 
process has been decreasing clearly after dollarization for execution. Although, the interval is 
short, the magnitude of reallocations also seems to decrease for approval, especially in the 
interval when the FRL was in place. In other words, the FRL seems to have been effective in 
restraining budget reallocations at approval stage. In summary, all of the actors of the budget 
process seem to have experienced a reduction in their capacity to reallocate resources across 
items.  
 
Table 9. Mean item-budget reallocations at different stages of the process 
 
Year Mean  CBLi×10
2
   Mean  CBri×10
2   Mean  CRdi×10
2 Mean  CBdi×10
2  
1990  .24   -   .61  .56   
1991  .30   -   .52  .68   
1992  .38   -   .73  .71   
1993  .25   -   .70  .60   
1994  .16   -   .71  .70   
1995  .31 *  -    .87 .76  
1996  .12   -   .64  .72   
1997  .20   -   .73  .84   
1998  .17 **  -    .85 .97  
1999 .00  **  .00  *** .81  .81   
2000 .07  *** .08    1.35  1.31   
2001 .95  *** .41    .95  1.23  * 
2002  .11   .11   .66  .57   
2003  .09  ** .22  ** .52  .44   
2004 .001  *** .00    .54  .54   
2005  .04   -   -  -   
 
Note: B=composition of spending in Executive budget proposal, L=composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, R=real 
composition of spending in budget law approved by congress, D=composition of spending in the total executed expenditure. T-tests refer to 
comparisons between year t and year t+1. Equality of difference is rejected at: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. Within each year, n=19 expenditure 
items. For comparability, debt payments have been excluded from the budget. 
Source: Data collected by the authors for this paper from congress and the Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
 
Table 9 presents the mean annual budget reallocation by item. It allows comparing whether there 
was more or less dispersion in reallocations across items over time. Although sample sizes are 
small (n=19), t-tests of the equality of means comparing year t to year t+1 are also reported in 
the table. Most significant differences concentrate after 1998 and in the approval stage columns 
(first two columns) and less so at the execution one (last two columns). 
 
We finally examine the effect of three institutional changes on budget reallocations. The three 
critical moments are the ones described earlier: the 1998 Constitution, the dollarization of the 
economy, and a sub-moment of the latter, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL). We refer to them 
as institutional changes. 
  
 43
To test whether each of the institutional changes affected in any systematic way the outcomes of 
the budget process, we estimate the following reduced-form regression using OLS: 
 
it it t t t i CXY ε γ γ γ β α + + + + + = 3 3 2 2 1 1  
 
Where i and are item fixed effects, t1, t2, and t3  are dummy variables that take the value one in 
the fiscal years  following a given institutional change (1999 onwards for the Constitutional 
reform, 2001 onwards for dollarization, and 2003-2005 for the FRL, respectively) and zero 
elsewhere, and εit is an i.i.d. error term. The omitted category for the item variable is i=Finance 
which –as argued earlier- is one of the sectors with the largest fluctuations in its relative share on 
total spending throughout the budget process.  
 
A positive γ1, γ2, or γ3 indicates whether spending experienced -on average- larger changes at any 
stage of the budget process after one of the institutional changes, for instance, dollarization. In 
turn, a positive β would indicate whether –relative to the line item Finance- any given spending 
item had bigger changes at approval stage.  
 
Table 10 and Table 11 present the results of the estimations. Table 10 focuses on the two 
dependent variables related to the budget approval stage, while Table 11 focuses on the 
dependent variables at the execution stage of the budget process. For clarity, we only report the γ 
parameters, or the effects of institutional changes. Two different models were computed, by 
including different sets of controls in the regressions. Model 1 includes only the institutional 
change dummies and Model 2 adds the vector of item dummies. 
 
Table 10. Effect of institutional changes on changes in the composition of expenditure at approval stage of the 
budget process 
   Approved – Presented  Really approved - Presented 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
1998 Constitution  .005  *** .005  *** .002  **  .002  *** 
Dollarization  -.001  *** -.002  *** -.002  *** -.002  *** 
FRL  -.005  *** -.005  *** -.001  *  -.001  * 
Observations 282  282  265  265 
Adjusted R2  .12 .26 .03  .23 
 
Note: Dependent variable is |Participation of item i at stage x – Participation of item i at stage y|. Model 1 includes only dummy variables that are 
1 for all post-change budgets. Model 2 adds item-specific dummies. For comparability, debt payments have been excluded from the budget.  
Significant at: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. 
 
A first exploration of the tables reveals that the different institutional shocks appear to have not 
only distinct effects on budget outcomes, but also they seem to matter at different stages of the 
process. The 1998 Constitution has a positive and significant effect at approval stage. This effect 
is robust to the different model specifications as well as to the two alternative definitions of the 
approved budget. However, the effect of the Constitution is insignificant in explaining variation 
in budget reallocations at execution stages. 
 
Interestingly, The effect of Dollarization and the FRL at approval stage move in the opposite 
direction to that of the Constitution. These two shocks have negative and significant coefficients,  
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suggesting that, as a response to them, spending experienced -on average- smaller changes at 
approval stage of the budget process. 
 
Table 11. Effect of institutional changes on changes in the composition of expenditure at execution stage of 
the budget process 
   Executed - Really approved  Executed – Presented 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
1998 Constitution  -.003   -.003   -.002   -.002   
Dollarization  .003 * .004 **  .003  * .004 ** 
FRL  -.003   -.003   -.004   -.004  * 
Observations 263  263  263  263 
Adjusted R2  .01 .22 .01  .24 
 
Note: Dependent variable is |Participation of item i at stage x – Participation of item i at stage y|. Model 1 includes only dummy variables that are 
1 for all post-change budgets. Model 2 adds item-specific dummies. For comparability, debt payments have been excluded from the budget. 
Significant at: *** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%. 
 
Interestingly, the sign of the effect of dollarization reverses in the regressions that explain 
variation in budget reallocation at execution stages. However, the coefficient of the FRL remains 
negative and borderline significant through these set of regressions. This could be –in part- a 
result of the short life of the law that manifests in a small number of observations. At the same 
time, the sign of this coefficient is consistent with the spirit of the law, in that it reduced the 
power of congress and the Executive to undertake budget reallocations. 
 
The fact that we reject that the effect of dollarization on budget reallocations is equal to zero and 
negative at approval stage but positive at execution stage provides evidence that extended time 
horizons and fewer inter temporal constraints on political actors introduced by dollarization 
encouraged a move towards less budget reallocations at the approval stage but had the opposite 
effect at execution stage. While the regressions cannot tell us about the forces behind these 
patterns, it is likely that they relate to the different actors, institutional features, and bargaining 
mechanisms that come into play at the different stages of the budget process, many of which are 
discussed throughout this document. 
 
1.3.2. Efficiency in education spending: a case study 
 
In this section, we explore the allocation of spending in education as a case study to illustrate 
how, in this particular sector, there were any changes associated to the 1998 Constitutional 
reform in the efficiency criteria guiding how these resources are used.  Figure 8 and Figure 9 
summarize some trends of provincial spending in primary education between school years 1995-
1996 and 2001-2002. Given that there is data for only one school year after the dollarization of 
the economy, the analysis of this section will focus on any changes in spending patterns before 
and after the 1998 Constitutional reform. The available data series consistent over time refer 
exclusively to Hispanic education, and excludes bilingual education institutions (the Education 
budget has a separate line item devoted to these schools). Data series on the budget allocated to 
these schools, as well as the size of the student population and the number of teachers at the 
province level.  
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 depict the changes in these associations over time. Figure 8 presents the 
evolution of per-student spending across provinces, while Figure 9 presents data on spending per 
teacher.  Throughout this section, the province of Galápagos emerges as an outlier that receives 
significantly larger allocations of money for primary schooling. Since it is likely that the costs of 
running schools in the sparsely populated islands differ substantially from those elsewhere, this 
province will be excluded from the graphs and the discussion. 
 
Several patterns are clear from the two graphs. First, while the variation in per student spending 
across provinces is wide, there is some evidence that it becomes narrower during this period. 
However, there is not a clear decreasing trend in the dispersion of these variables. Excluding 
Galápagos, the ratio from the largest-to-smallest per-student provincial spending in 1995 is 2.9 
and it goes down to 2.3 by 2001. This ratio experiences a rise in 1999, where it reaches a value 
of 3.1. An even more erratic pattern is observed in per-teacher provincial spending, where the 
ratio from the largest-to-smallest value decreases from 1.7 to 1.6 between 1995 and 2001, with a 
sharp rise to 2.3 in 1999. However, it is positive that the overall range in variation in per-teacher 
spending is smaller than that in per-student spending. This is indicative that school funding is 
allocated on the basis of student size and not teacher size, which would create a perverse 
incentive for schools to hire more teachers than needed. 
 
A second factor is that is clear form the table is that the magnitude of per-student and per-teacher 
spending in primary education decreases over this period. While again, the decrease is not 
constant over time, the trend is clearer when comparing the years before and after the 1998 
Constitutional reform (i.e. 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 vs. 1999, 2000, and 2001). The 
downward shift in spending is most pronounced in 2000, but recovers substantially afterwards.  
 





















































Note: Figure excludes Galápagos. 
Source: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador, SIISE – 2006.  
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The third pattern in Figure 8 and Figure 9 is that the ranking in per-student and per-teacher 
spending across provinces remains relatively stable, with few exceptions. For instance, the 
province of Napo moves up in the ranking in 1999, while it moves down in 1997. Morona, Loja, 
Pastaza, and Zamora are the other two provinces that fluctuate in the ranking. The determinants 
of the success (or lack thereof) of these provinces in receiving larger allocations for primary 
education could be explored in more detail as case studies. 
 





















































Note: Figure excludes Galápagos. 
Source: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador, SIISE – 2006. 
 
Lastly, Figure 10 illustrates the correlation between per-student and per-teacher spending and 
provincial poverty in 1990. The data suggest that there have been important changes in the 
allocation of spending during this period. Specifically, the distribution of primary school 
spending became more progressive. In 2001, poor provinces received relatively larger allocations 
for primary education than less poor provinces. This was not the case in 1995. In 2001, the 
correlation coefficient between poverty and spending per student is .60 and between poverty and 
spending per teacher, it is 0.57. This represents a large improvement relative to 1995, where the 
correlation coefficient between poverty and spending per student was .02 and between poverty 
and spending per teacher, it was -0.05. Interestingly, Galápagos is the only province that moved 
in the opposite direction: during this period, its spending (both per student and per teacher) 
diverted away from the rest of the distribution. 
 
Based on the above observations, there are five patterns that emerge from the changes in 
education spending during this period. First, variation in per-student (and per-teacher) allocations 
across provinces seems to decrease, but the variable moves erratically.  Second, it seems that 
funding allocation gives the right incentives to schools by making them proportional to student  
 47
(rather than teacher) size. Third, spending in primary education experiences a decrease in 
magnitude during the period studied. Fourth, there are few changes in the ranking of provinces in 
terms of the relative allocations they receive. And lastly, spending in primary education appears 
to move towards a more progressive trend.  
These indicators seem to support that allocation of resources in this sector moved closer to a 
more equitable and efficient path in the period of study by this paper. However, efficiency in 
resource allocation has not translated in better educational outcomes. Data from the last two 
population censuses demonstrates that despite all the investments in the sector, the net 
enrollment ratio remained constant between 1990 and 2001. There are no series of standardized 
test scores that can produce comparable measures of other educational outcomes. What we 
conclude from these facts is that investments in educational inputs and school construction are 
necessary but not sufficient to improve schooling outcomes. International experience suggests 
that improvements in teachers’ and students’ attendance, school accountability, and quality of 
instruction are usually more difficult to accomplish, but are fundamental in improving the quality 
of education. Beyond the supply-side, demand side interventions such as fellowships or 
conditional cash transfers have also proven to be effective (in Ecuador and elsewhere) in 
producing better educational outcomes. 
 




























































Spending per teacher 01
Spending per teacher 95
Spending per student 01
Spending per student 95
 
Note: Figure excludes Galápagos. 
Source: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador, SIISE – 2006. Poverty data is from 1990 Ecuador Poverty Map 
prepared by the World Bank (Elbers et al. 2002). 
 
6.3  Representativity of budget outcomes 
 
As developed in section 3.1 the 1998 Constitution and related reforms adopted significant 
electoral changes that affected the level and quality of representation.  This section measures the 
magnitude and direction of such changes and their impact on the representativity of budget  
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outcomes, measured as the province-level of per capita spending.
81  The data presented compares 
spending outcomes of budgets before and after the 1998 constitutional reform (1997 and 2004, 
respectively).  Data on provincial spending was available only for two years prior to the 
implementation of the constitutional reform: 1997 and 1998. 1997 was chosen as a benchmark 
year because the economy was more stable than in 1998. Moreover, a new government took 
office in1998, making this a more peculiar year. 
 
The section starts with a sequence of descriptive statistics, or a discussion of the observed 
changes in the main variables of interest including per capita spending across provinces and 
political variables before and after the 1998 Constitution. After discussing bivariate variations, 
we attempt to disentangle their relative importance using multivariate analysis. The section 
concludes with a brief exploration of the relationship between representativity of budget 
outcomes and poverty. 
 
Per capita provincial spending and its changes between 1997-2004 
 
Figure 11 depicts the large dispersion in per capita spending across provinces. It also 
demonstrates that spending in per capita terms is inversely correlated to population size. These 
are not surprising findings by themselves, as differences in spending could be explained by 
differences in provinces’ needs (or poverty in 1990) as well as by differences in their 
characteristics (geographic, ethnic, historic, and other), or by the presence of economies of scale 
in the provision of services in areas with higher population densities. Galápagos is a clear outlier 
in this distribution, and the differences are likely to be due to its very unique attributes.  
 
Figure 11 seems consistent with a relatively progressive pattern of spending, where provinces 
that are poorer receive more resources on a per capita basis. The graph illustrates that there are 
two clusters of provinces. Excluding Galápagos, provinces that are below median poverty are 
also likely to have lower levels of per capita expenditure. The opposite is true for provinces 
above median poverty. However, this apparently progressive pattern of spending is not clear cut 
and this suggests that the distribution of spending across provinces is a product of more complex 
policy decisions and tradeoffs. For example, while per capita expenditure (and population sizes) 
is similar between pairs of provinces such as Cotopaxi-Imbabura and Chimborazo-Esmeraldas, 
poverty is 17% (or 8 percentage points) higher in Cotopaxi than in Imbabura and 29% (or 11 
percentage points) higher in Chimborazo than in Esmeraldas. This section sheds light on some of 









                                                 
81 For details on definitions and description of provincial-level spending data used, see Albornoz, Vicente. 2000. 
Gobierno Central, Autonomías y Finanzas Provinciales, Cuadernos de Descentralización, CORDES, Quito-
Ecuador. The 2004 data were collected for this study maintaining consistency in the definitions used in 1997.  
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Note: Galápagos is not included in figure. 
Sources:  Provincial expenditure data from Albornoz (2000) and from data collected by the authors for this study. 
Population data from INEC. Poverty data from 1990 poverty map constructed by the World Bank (Elbers et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the changes in per capita expenditure between 1997 and 2004. Each dot 
represents one province. In the vertical axis, we depict the ratio of the 2004 per capita 
expenditure over that in 1997. The horizontal axis illustrates province size in terms of 
population. This figure also distinguishes across provinces above and below median provincial 
poverty. The ratio of 2004 to 1997 spending and population size are negatively associated, 
suggesting that smaller provinces (in terms of population) saw larger increases in per capita 
spending over this period. Based on the chosen measure for the representativity of budget 
outcomes, this trend demonstrates over the period, budget outcomes moved in the direction of 
being less representative. When comparing whether larger increases in spending are correlated to 
provinces’ poverty, the answer is less clear. A few large provinces with lower poverty rates such 
as Pichincha, Guayas and Azuay saw smaller increases in per capita spending while a few small 
provinces with higher poverty such as Napo and Sucumbíos saw higher increases. However, for 
the rest of the provinces (more than three quarters of them), there no clear association between 
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Note: Galápagos is not included in figure. 
Sources:  Provincial expenditure data from Albornoz (2000) and from data collected by the 
authors for this study. Population data from INEC. Poverty data from 1990 poverty map 
constructed by the World Bank. 
 
Given the large heterogeneity in terms of population across Ecuadorian provinces, per capita 
expenditure can tell an imperfect story about representativity of expenditure. To complement this 
discussion, the next figure illustrates the association between provincial per capita expenditure 
and provincial poverty.  
 
Figure 13 depicts per capita provincial spending before and after the 1998 Constitution in the 
vertical axis and poverty in the horizontal axis. Provincial level poverty is measured in 1990. 
Provincial poverty data is only available for 1990 and 2001. 1990 was chosen as a benchmark 
year for the poverty data, as any effects on poverty of subsequent economic and political reforms 
would not be reflected. 
 
Figure 13 illustrates there is a positive association between expenditure and poverty: per capita 
expenditure is larger in relative terms in those provinces where poverty was higher, (which is 
worth noticing are also smaller provinces in terms of population). This positive association is 
observed before and after the 1998 reform. What is more interesting is that after the 1998 reform, 
the trend line appears to become steeper. This suggests that for a given increase in poverty, the 
difference in per capita expenditure has become wider. As long as this effect is more pronounced 
among poorer provinces, it can be suggestive of some type of progressivity in spending. This 






































































Note: For clarity, figure excludes Galápagos. Poverty figures correspond to 1990. 
Sources: Provincial expenditure data from Albornoz (2000) and from data collected by the authors for 
this study. Poverty data from 1990 Poverty Map prepared by the World Bank (Elbers et al. 2002). 
 
Post-1998 institutional reforms 
 
As explained by sections 4.1, and 6.3-4, many institutional reforms introduced after 1998 
significantly altered the electoral dynamics in Ecuador. Electoral reforms were adopted to elect 
legislators through a personalized vote, first by simple plurality (1998) and then through some 
form of proportional representation rule (2000, 2002).  Secondly, the total number of legislators 
was increased from 82 in 1996 to 100 in 2002 and the election of national legislators was 
eliminated.
82  In theory, these changes should have encouraged legislators to cultivate personal 
and local followings as opposed to being responsive to their party leaderships, and contribute to 
the proliferation of political parties and the fragmentation of the legislative landscape.  From the 
presidents’ perspective, these should have contributed to an increase in transaction costs for 
forming budget coalitions, since more fragmented and provincial players were involved in the 
budget process. 
 
One useful measure of equity in the electoral representation is captured by the concept of 
malapportionment, defined as the discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share 
of population held by geographical units (Samuels and Snyder 2001).  The measure of 
malapportionment illustrates deviations from the democratic “one man one vote” principle and it 
shows differences in the relative weights of citizens’ votes across districts.
83  
                                                 
82 The 1998 congress elected 121 members, 20 of which were national.  In theory, this should have been the most 
proportional congress of recent years, but it is not included in this analysis because such arrangement only lasted 
until 2002. 
83 The formula for calculating aggregate malapportionment is:  
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It is possible to track the evolution of provincial malapportionment in the periods before and 
after the 1998 Constitution. The malapportionment measure computed at the provincial level 
suggests that the Constitution led to a very small decrease in malapportionment (mean 
malapportionment went down from 41 to 37 and the difference is not significantly different from 
zero). This means that the reform had a minuscule effect in terms of it magnitude. The direction 
of this effect was towards the reduction the relative weight of a vote in all but four relatively 
small provinces (Bolivar, Cañar, Carchi, and Napo). This change could be consistent with the 
decrease in representativeness of budget outcomes that was observed after the reform. Moreover, 
the effect of the 1998 constitutional reform on budget outcomes cannot be disentangled with 
another important reform that occurred during this period: the implementation of a 
decentralization law that mandated that 15 percent of all government spending had to be 
distributed across sub national governments. This could potentially reinforce the decrease in 
representativeness of budget outcomes if smaller provinces (in population terms) were also the 
ones that benefited relatively more in per capita terms from the decentralization law. 
 
 
6.4  Adaptability / rigidity of Budget Outcomes 
 
The budgetary rigidity comes from factors that limit the government’s capacity to modify its 
budget in the short run. When analyzed from this perspective, the rigidity in Ecuador’s fiscal 
budget presents itself in various ways. Those which are most known are earmarks and a high 
salary component (as seen in section 6.1), but there are also other types of inflexibilities such as 
expenditure that is conditioned or tied to specific projects or subsidies. The high rigidity in the 
budget turns fiscal policy-making more difficult and creates a bias towards spending. 
Furthermore, it negatively impacts the quality of public expenditure and has other effects that are 
beyond the boundaries of this study to analyze.  To the extent possible, Ecuador’s budget rigidity 
is measured in this section and some of recent reforms in this direction are outlined. 
 
The main conclusions are that Ecuador has a high budgetary rigidity and than it has only gotten 
worse since 1998. During that year, earmarks for sectional governments rose up to constitutional 
level and the earmark for education was maintained. In 2001, an option to donate income taxes to 
other sources was established. 
 
1.7.1 Rigidity in the Central Government’s Budget 
 
The Central Government’s Budget presents a 92% of inflexibility
84 due to the existence of: i) 
earmarks; ii) wages; iii) subsidies; iv) expenditure tied to specific projects; and v) interest 
payments on foreign debt. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
MAL = (1/2) Σ | si - vi | 
where sigma stands for the summation over all districts i, si is the percentage of all seats allocated to district i, and vi 
is the percentage of the overall population (or registered voters) residing in district i.  In this paper we calculate the 
ratio between a district’s population and the seat share obtained in congress for each province.  In the case of 
congresses with “National Legislators”, we add the district’s provincial seats to the province’s share of national 
legislators. 
84 Almeida 2005.  
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The Ecuadorian budget does not show all real revenues and expenditures because there are 
certain earmarked revenues that are handed directly to the beneficiaries before they enter the 
National Treasure. Additionally, certain expenditures such as subsidies to domestic gas and 
gasoline are already accounted for as costs for Petroecuador, the state oil company, so they are 




Earmarks are revenues and expenditures that are legally predestined
85 to a specific source and 
were created as a means for the Legislative branch to ensure the allocation of resources to 
determined programs or institutions and offset their lack of formal access to the budget.
86 
 
Although legally they should not exist, in practice they are maintained. The Budget Law 
mandates respect for unity and universality principles,
87 and specifically prohibits earmarked 
expenditures,
88 or at least limits them to be received after they have been technically justified. 
89 
The Constitution, nevertheless, determines that 30% of the GGB must be destined to education.
90 
 
Those earmarks that distribute resources from oil and tax revenues to the beneficiaries before 
those funds enter the budget are known as “earmarks on revenues”, while pre-assigned revenues 
that have already been registered in the budget are called “earmarks on expenditures” (Table 13). 
 
The 2006 Central Government’s budget proposal includes only US$262.8 million in the GGB, 
the rest is, in part, in the budgets of autonomous entities and another part is directly transferred to 

















                                                 
85 Gallardo 2001. 
86 Almeida 2005. 
87 Art. 4. 
88 Art. 6. 
89 Art. 7. 
90 Art. 71. 
91 MEF, Central Government’s 2006 budget proposal.   
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Table 12. Earmark Classification 
 
  Type of earmark  # of earmarks  Total in 2006   
US$ million 
Tax 32  1,002.57  Revenue 
Oil 25  726.94 
Compensations  











established by Law 
but that do not have 
financing 
 
           Source: Gallardo 2001. 
 
6.4.2  Earmarks on revenues 
 
The budget proposal for 2006 shows that 79.15% of total tax collections were supposed to 
become part of the budget while 20.9% was to be distributed among different actors. The main 
beneficiaries of tax revenue earmarks are universities and sectional governments (Figure 14 and 
Figure 15), Income tax and Value Added Tax (VAT) providing with the most resources to hand 
to participants.  
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    Source: MEF, 2006 budget proposal 
 
Earmarks on oil revenues represent 14.52% of total oil revenues.
92 The Fiscal Responsibility, 
Stabilization and Transparency Law determines that all state revenues from participation in crude 
oil of up to 23° API from exploration and exploitation contracts have to be deposited in a special 
account called Special Account for Social and Productive Reactivation,  Scientific and 
Technological Development and Fiscal Stabilization (CEREPS). Part of the resources from the 
CEREPS are marked as a predetermined transfer of capital to Central Government entities (US$ 
184.5 million for education; US$ 158 million for health and US$26.3 million for road 
maintenance), the rest of the resources from this earmark are part of the budgets of autonomous 
and decentralized entities. The main beneficiaries from earmarks in oil revenues, aside from 
those assigned through the CEREPS, are sectional organizations, specifically the Institute for 
Amazonian Regional Eco-development –ECORAE- (13.2% of total earmarks on oil revenues), 
the Board of Defense (6.9%) and the Executive Corporation for the Reconstruction of Zones 
Affected by El Niño –Corpecuador- (3.3%). 
 
When oil revenues turn out to be larger than originally budgeted, they are transferred to the Oil 
Stabilization Fund (Fondo de Estabilización Petrolero – FEP), that is an account managed by the 
Central Bank. For the purposes of the State General Budget, oil revenues are defined as those 
from exports of oil and its sub-products as well as those from their domestic sales. Revenues 
from domestic sales of oil sub-products are net of production costs and of costs of imports of 
gasoline and diesel, which are imported when the capacity of national refineries is not enough to 
supply the domestic market. 
 
At the end of every year, the Central Bank liquidates the FEP and distributes it accordingly to the 
following rule: 
                                                 
92 MEF, Central Government’s 2006 budget proposal .  
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1. The Central Government receives enough resources to cover for the budgeted oil 
revenues. In the last years it was often the case that revenues from exports were above 
what was budgeted, while the revenues from domestic sales were below those budgeted. 
In such a case, the surplus of the former covers for the shortfall of the latter and the 
government receives the amount that it had expected to receive. 
2.  If there is still a surplus after distributing the resources described above, it is allocated 
with the following criteria: 45% for the management of liabilities; 35% for maintenance 
and pavement of a highway in the main oil producing region (the vía Troncal 
Amazónica); 10% to finance development projects in the provinces of Esmeraldas, Loja, 
Carchi, El Oro, and Galápagos; and 10% for equipment and strengthening of the national 
police. This means that 100% of the surplus oil revenues are earmarked. 
 
6.4.3  Earmarks on expenditures 
 
Aside from earmarks on revenues, there are fixed and inflexible expenditures such as wages; 
earmarks and compensations on expenditures; subsidies; projects with domestic and foreign 
debt; and foreign debt interest payments
93 (Figure 16). 
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        Source: MEF, 2006 budget 
 
According to the MEF, there are 303,239 public servants, whose wages and salaries represent 
28.4% of total expenditures. Out of the total budget estimates of expenditures on wages and 
salaries, 74.2% is concentrated in the following sectors: Education (39.4%), National Defense 
(20.8%) and Internal Affairs and Police (14%). 
 
Resources transferred to sectional governments are the main source of outflows in expenditure 
earmarks, including a Law requiring a 15% transfer to municipalities and provincial 
governments, FODESEC and FONDEPRO. 
                                                 
93 Almeida, Gallardo, Tomaselli; Gobernabilidad Fiscal en Ecuador, July 2005.  
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6.4.4  Subsidies and transfers 
 
Another set of budget inflexibilities is comprised of various subsidies within the budget, such as 
the BDH program (a targeted conditional cash-transfer program that benefits over a million 
families), transfers to social security institutions, subsidies to the electricity sector and the public 
financial sector, among others.  
 
7  Summary and Conclusion  
 
Ecuador offers an interesting case study to analyze –from a political economy perspective- the 
impact of major political and economic reforms on the budget process and, consequently, on 
budget outcomes.  The focus on budget outcomes reflects this paper’s concern to find a 
comprehensive account of the changing incentives for cooperation that budget players have 
under different political and budgetary arrangements. 
 
The paper finds that the set of constitutional reforms adopted in 1998 and other political reforms 
adopted in previous years (1996-1998) offered relevant budget players a contradictory set of 
incentives for cooperation.  On the one hand, they gave legislators incentives to be more 
responsive and accountable to their constituents by allowing them to seek reelection and stay 
longer terms in office, and by strengthening the role of the budget committee in the congress. On 
the other hand, it constricted the role of congress in the general budget process, by giving the 
executive greater agenda setting power over formulation and execution, and by banning 
legislators from accessing or negotiating budget allocations for provinces.  In the end, the greater 
agenda setting powers of the executive contributed to more sustainability of the budget process.  
From a political standpoint, the budget became less efficient as more budget reallocations took 
place during approval stage.  Despite some important electoral reforms aimed at adjusting the 
proportionality of the electoral system, the budget did not become more representative.  And 
finally, constitutional reforms contributed to greater earmarking and therefore more rigid (less 
flexible) budget outcomes.  
 
Dollarization reforms and the associated adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility Law significantly 
constrained the choice of fiscal policy instruments available to governments.  Dollarization 
imposed a de facto need for fiscal discipline as the government could no longer print money.  By 
eliminating the role of the monetary authority, dollarization also contributed to shifting policy 
choices to the legislative arena, where policy change has been traditionally rigid.  At the same 
time, a rise in international oil prices and therefore an increase in oil revenues also contributed to 
more budget rigidity by encouraging further earmarking of oil reserve funds.  On a more positive 
light, dollarization contributed to greater budget sustainability, and greater efficiency (i.e. fewer) 
budget reallocations, especially during execution stage.  Again, these two effects have to be 
considered in the context of increasing oil prices and moderate economic growth. 
 
Although this paper does not calculate the net effect of the two types of reforms on budget 
outcomes, the overall effect indicates that current budget outcomes have become more 
sustainable and efficient, although less representative and adaptable to changing needs.  In other 
words, the observed budget outcomes suggests that political and economic reforms have pushed  
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in the direction of greater budget governance, though at the expense of marginalizing key players 
such as the national congress. 
 
This paper proposes that the budget outcomes resulting from the existing institutional 
configuration are outside an equilibrium path, and thus are not sustainable in the long run.  A 
closer look at budget dynamics finds that relevant players do not have incentives to sustain 
political agreements over the long run because of existing asymmetries in the balance of power 
(weak legislature combined with a strong executive and sub national government), and the 
continued presence of windfall oil revenues that dissolve actors’ incentives for budget discipline.   
 
A clear example of this unstable equilibrium is the short-lived Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL). 
The Law, initially approved in 2002, was designed to prevent increases in oil revenues from 
expanding expenditure. The law was approved in a period when there were expectations that oil 
production and revenues would increase due to the construction of a new oil pipe. Furthermore, 
the effects of the 1999 economic crisis were still fresh in the memories of congressmen and of 
the general public. In this context, it was possible for the government to build an agreement 
around a set of principles of fiscal responsibility and to find enough support for congress to pass 
the law. Congress approved the FRL under the understanding that it would come into effect with 
the new government and the new congress that were to begin their term in 2003. Therefore, 
neither the congress nor the executive imposed the spending constraints from the FRL upon 
themselves during their terms and their (potential) reelection campaigns. By 2005, the reality of 
international oil markets had changed dramatically. In that context, a discourse of opposition to 
expenditure constraints imposed by the FRL gained popularity. Following a proposal from the 
executive, congress profoundly modified –and de facto derogated- the basic principles of the 
FRL. This reform came into effect immediately, which meant that resources for public spending 
were liberated just before the approval of the next state budget. Therefore, both congress and the 
executive benefited directly from more lax fiscal rules during their terms and their (potential) 
reelection campaigns. Furthermore, the same political parties that supported the approval of the 
FRL in 2003 were the ones that, in 2005, voted to reform it. 
 
The story of the FRL –both during its approval and its reform- illustrates the point that shifts in 
policy priorities remain vulnerable to short-term incentives from both congress and the 
executive. Furthermore, in both moments political actors protected their own potential gains 
from the budget process and passed-on the costs of their policy decisions to their successors. 
This behavior is not consistent with the long-term health of fiscal finances and illustrates our 
argument that the current –apparently healthier- budget outcomes are politically unsustainable. 
 
Finally, there are two elements of the current budget process that deserve further analysis: the 
shifting of the budget dynamics from the national to the sub national arena, and the impact of 
rising oil revenues on political cooperation. 
 
The first one of these elements, the shift of budget politics from the national to the local sphere, 
is a combined effect of two events that resulted from the 1998 constitutional reforms.  On the one 
hand, there is a deliberate effort from the executive to weaken and undermine the influence of 
congress in the budget process since 1995. Although politicians become more “accountable” to 
their voters, they gradually lose access to budget allocations and other legal means for delivering  
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constituency services. Frustrated legislators are left with very few options to influence on the 
policymaking process and advance their political careers: they could radically oppose 
government initiatives, they could find clandestine mechanisms for allocating resources, or they 
could leave the congress in search of more attractive political arenas.  Concurrently, there is a 
gradual strengthening of local governments caused by the constitutional allocation of greater 
resources (an earmarking of 15% of government spending), plus the adoption of other legal and 
technical reforms (such as the Ley Organica de Regimen Municipal) that gave them greater 
autonomy from the central government and increased influence on the budget making process.   
This paper proposes that politicians find clear political incentives to move from a resource-dry 
policy arena to a policy realm where they enjoy abundant resources, more discretionality, and 
clearer electoral links with their constituents. This movement is echoed by national political 
parties who find in the sub national arena the governability incentives and credibility that they 
lack at the national level. 
 
The second element that deserves further analysis has to do with the high dependency of the 
economy on oil revenues and the practice of earmarking the budget.  During periods of low oil 
prices, scarce revenues have a direct negative impact on fiscal performance that non-oil revenues 
cannot compensate for.  During boom periods, increased oil revenues create incentives for 
further fiscal spending.  The greater agenda setting power of the president on budgetary affairs, 
which is generally considered a contributing factor to fiscal discipline, becomes a liability as 
there are multiple incentives to invest oil monies for political gain. A similar logic applies to 
explaining the volatility of oil stabilization funds.  In a context of rigid budget rules and 
significant earmarking, rising oil revenues increase the budgetary constraint and reduce political 
incentives for fiscal discipline.  
 
A more comprehensive analysis of these elements is necessary to gain a better understanding of 
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Annex 1. Measuring Changes in the Composition of Spending 
(Scartascini and Stein 2005) 
 






















where Xi and Yi are the shares of item i on total spending at the stages X and Y of the budget process, 
respectively. Therefore CXYi can be interpreted as the item-specific changes in the XY phases. Following 
the notation in Scartascini and Stein, we focus on the following phases of the budget process (or Xs and 
Ys): 
B= Executive budget proposal,  
L= budget law approved by congress,  
R= real budget law approved by congress,  
D= total executed expenditure. 
 
The inclusion of phase R deserves an explanation. After the adoption of the 1998 Constitution, increases 
in total spending (or reductions in revenues) at approval stage were no longer possible (see table 3). 
Therefore, the only way of increasing expenditure of one specific budget item was to decrease spending 
of another one. What we observe is that after 1998, at approval stage, congress agrees on a list of changes 
to the budget proposal sent by the Executive (in words) that are reflected in the formal budget law that is 
approved. However, faced with formal constraints to increase spending, we argue that legislators mask 
alternative allocations that further their political interest under the formal budget law. For example, the 
budget law may decrease interest payments while increasing social spending. In practice, those interests 
correspond to compromises acquired by the country that need to be repaid. What this “reallocation” 
means is a de facto increase in total spending. 
 
To construct phase R, what we call the real budget law approved by congress, we went over the list of 
changes to the budgets approved by congress every year and did an interpretation of their implications in 
terms of budget. Not all budget items experienced changes when these corrections were made. In fact, 
75% of the item-year records remained unchanged, while 7% decreased and 18% increased in magnitude. 
In terms of total spending, the R  correction shows that the budget law masked an increase in total 
spending at approval stage for all years except 1999 and 2004. The first of these years, 1999,  is also the 
first year immediately after the approval of the Constitution (and the first budget whose approval was 
legislated by it), which was probably in the steep part of the “learning curve” in terms of the constraints 
and limitations imposed to congress of this new piece of legislation. 2004 is also a unique year. The 
budget was approved in October 2003, when the government of president Gutiérrez did not face strong 
opposition in congress and the Minister of Finance gained support from the president and from congress 
for an austere budget. 
   